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Conflicting theories suggest opposing predictions for the role of working memory 
capacity (WMC) and mind wandering in insight problem solving and creativity. The 
executive-control-benefit perspective suggests that insight problem solving and creativity 
would benefit from the effectively focused attention that high WMC enables. Focused 
attention should help guide a selective search of solution-relevant information in memory 
and help inhibit uncreative yet accessible ideas. In contrast, the executive-control-cost 
perspective suggests that unfocused attention would be beneficial to insight and 
creativity, as it should allow access to more loosely relevant concepts, remotely linked to 
commonplace ideas. By inserting incubation periods into two insight problems and two 
creativity tasks, my main goal was to test whether or not WMC and mind wandering 
during the incubation tasks predict post-incubation performance on insight and creativity 
problems. Yet a third possibility, however, is that individual differences in WMC predict 
flexibility in control, such that people with higher WMC better adjust attentional focus 
(i.e., narrowly or broadly) to fit the requirements of the task. For instance, there is less 
benefit to mind wandering during a stand-alone attention task than during the incubation 
period of an insight problem or creativity task, where task-unrelated thoughts could lead 
to progress toward the problem-solving or creative goal. Following up on previous 
research, I also explored the possibility, in both studies, that self-reported concentration 
during the attention-demanding tasks may moderate the relationship between WMC and 
mind wandering in the lab, as it does in daily-life activities. In a second experiment I 
included an openness measure and a need for cognition measure in order to assess the 
moderating role of intellectual motivation on WMC to predict success in insight and 
creativity. Overall, results suggest that WMC is beneficial for certain insight problems, 
but not for creativity, and whereas mind wandering is not helpful for creativity, it may in 
fact be harmful in some insight problems. In addition, concentration does not seem to 
interact with WMC to predict mind wandering in the lab like it does in daily life. Finally, 
although openness to experience predicted both TUTs and creativity, neither openness to 
experience nor need for cognition moderated the relationship between WMC and insight 
or creativity.  
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Variation in working memory capacity, in part, reflects individual differences in 
domain-general, attention control capabilities (e.g., Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 
2007) and positively predicts higher-order cognitive abilities such as reading 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), reasoning (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Salthouse, 1993), and analytical problem 
solving (Hambrick & Engle, 2003). According to an executive attention perspective, 
individual differences in domain-general executive attention allow for active maintenance 
of goal-relevant information in the face of response conflict and memory interference 
(Engle & Kane, 2004). Furthermore, this executive attention is thought to be important in 
analytical problem solving because it helps to maintain access to goals, plans, and other 
task-relevant information, and to inhibit task-irrelevant information (Hambrick & Engle, 
2003), both of which help solvers progress towards the correct solution (Kaplan & 
Simon, 1990). Overall, then, the research seems to agree that having greater attention 
control is beneficial for many things. But, is it beneficial for everything? Recently, some 
work has suggested a role for executive control in creativity and insight, but the literature 
is mixed in terms of what that role is—some argue that executive control is helpful for 
insight and creativity, while others maintain that a lack of executive control is ideal.   
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In two studies I will attempt to determine the influence of executive control on 
creativity and insight by correlating individual differences in working memory capacity 
(WMC) with creativity and insight, and by borrowing a design from the incubation 
literature to measure mind wandering while taking a break from creativity and insight 
problems. I also measured concentration during the mind wandering tasks to see whether 
it moderates the relationship between WMC and mind wandering. Previous work has 
suggested that this relationship may change depending on how much a person is 
concentrating; therefore, it is possible that we may be underestimating the relationship 
between WMC and mind wandering by omitting concentration. Finally, exclusively in 
the second experiment I tested the hypothesis that intellectual motivation may interact 
with WMC to predict success in insight and creativity by adding measures of openness 
and need for cognition.   
Defining Insight and Creativity 
 Insight problem solving is distinct from analytical problem solving, in that 
analytical problems benefit from the application of prior domain knowledge, whereas 
insight problems are initially hindered by prior knowledge. In analytical problem solving, 
previously learned information is necessary to orient one’s approach to the problem 
(Newell & Simon, 1972); however, in insight problem solving, prior knowledge acts as a 
stumbling block when the solver becomes fixated on one particular method of solving or 
thinking that has previously been successful, but is not currently (Chronicle, MacGregor, 
& Ormerod, 2004; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002). In 
order to reach the correct solution, then, the solver must restructure the problem, or think 
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about it in a new way (i.e., without the previous, unnecessary restraints; e.g., Ohlsson, 
1992; Weisberg, 1995). In a sense, the difficulty in analytical problem solving comes 
from the size of the search space, or the number of possible answers that must be 
retrieved or worked through in order to find the right one (Hambrick & Engle, 2003; 
Newell & Simon, 1972), whereas the difficulty in insight problem solving comes from 
the placement of false restraints on the problem, which initially makes it impossible to 
solve (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Ohlsson, 1992).  
 Similarly, creativity, or the process of generating novel and useful interpretations 
of old items and ideas, is also thought to be hindered at times by previously acquired 
knowledge of norms and commonplace uses (e.g., Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 
2007). It is only after these restraints are removed that one can think of innovative and 
creative ideas. For example, in the alternative uses task, a common laboratory task used 
to measure creative, or divergent, thinking (Guilford, 1967), subjects initially output 
“creative” uses for a common object that were simply retrieved from long term memory 
(Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). While these mundane responses are easy 
to access, people who are able to inhibit thinking about and reporting common uses by 
switching to a more effective strategy perform better (Gilhooly et al., 2007). In a second 
experiment, Gilhooly et al. asked subjects to distinguish between alternative-use 
responses that they had retrieved from memory from those that they generated on the 
spot. Gilhooly et al. found that executive functioning (as measured by a letter fluency 
task) was significantly correlated with the number of novel responses that were generated 
during the experiment, but unrelated to the number of responses retrieved from memory. 
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Their proposed mechanism of inhibiting common uses for an everyday object implicates 
a role for executive attention, and therefore, WMC.  
The Benefits of Executive Control to Insight and Creativity 
 Two opposing theories attempt to explain the mechanisms underlying insight. 
According to Gestalt theorists, insight results from an automatic and unconscious process 
(e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Ohlsson, 1992; Seifert, Meyer, 
Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995) whereby a sudden burst in neural activity allows 
solvers to realize relationships between components of the problem that were not 
previously perceived to be related (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Alternatively, others (e.g., 
Davidson, 1995; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Weisberg & Alba, 1981) have suggested that 
insight results from a controlled search of potential problem representations. This search 
for problem representations in insight problems is argued to be similar to the controlled 
search that allows navigation through the problem space of an analytical problem when 
progressing towards a solution (Kaplan & Simon, 1990). Just as WMC is beneficial for 
this controlled search component in analytical problem solving (Hambrick & Engle, 
2003), it follows that WMC would also play an important role in the controlled search 
within insight problems. Over the years, several researchers have attempted to elucidate 
this controversy by correlating performance on executive control tasks with insight 
problem solving rates and solution times (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly & 
Fioratou, 2009; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). The motivation for this approach is that if 
insight problems benefit from a controlled search process, then people with better 
attention control (who also have a higher WMC) will perform better on insight problems 
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than those with worse attention control (and lower WMC). Alternatively, if a controlled 
search plays no role in solving insight problems, then abilities that require attention 
control, such as WMC, should not be correlated with insight problem solving rates and 
times.  
 In analyses comparing insight to analytical problems, WMC is typically found to 
be significantly correlated with both insight and analytical problem solving times, such 
that people with higher WMC solve the problems faster than those with lower WMC (but 
don’t necessarily differ in solving rates; Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009; 
Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). Notably, in these studies, WMC predicted insight and 
analytical problem solving equally well. As a follow up to this finding, Gilhooly and 
Fioratou found that visuo-spatial and verbal WMC significantly predicted insight 
problem solving when entered as a second step into a statistical model that already 
contained measures of attentional inhibition and switching. From this, they concluded 
that WMC’s contribution to insight problem solving is through its storage capacity rather 
than its executive control mechanisms. 
 Ash and Wiley (2006) attempted to isolate the restructuring phase of insight 
problem solving (i.e., the point at which the solver rethinks the problem without the 
previous, self-imposed constraints), and WMC’s role therein, by comparing two versions 
of six insight problems. One group of problems, termed Many Moves Available 
problems, allowed for many possible moves before hitting an impasse, or getting stuck 
(i.e., they presented a large problem space). In the other group, Few Moves Available 
problems, allowed for only a few possible moves before hitting impasse, minimizing the 
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size of the problem search space before restructuring. WMC only predicted solving rates 
in Many Moves Available problems, and not Few Moves Available problems, suggesting 
WMC predicts insight problem solving when the initial search space, prior to 
restructuring, is large (i.e., when there are many wrong potential answers before hitting 
an impasse; Ash & Wiley, 2006), but that it is not important for restructuring. That is, 
restructuring does not benefit from controlled attention and is perhaps instead the result 
of some automatic processes. From these findings, they concluded that when the search 
space is large, a controlled search of the problem representations could be beneficial for 
restructuring. For example, high-WMC solvers, who are able to maintain unsuccessful 
problem attempts in memory, may notice a pattern among their failures that will help 
them move towards the correct answer. If problem solving success is facilitated by the 
ability to maintain failed attempts while searching a problem space for new solutions, 
then WMC, which allows for both the attention and memory capacity to do this, should 
be correlated with success in insight problem solving. 
 Consistent with Ash and Wiley’s (2006) findings, a similar pattern can be seen in 
the nine-dot problem (Chein, Weisberg, Streeter, & Kwok, 2010). Subjects were 
presented with a picture of nine dots arranged in the shape of a (3×3) square and were 
instructed to use four straight lines to connect all of the dots without lifting their pen from 
the paper. Although it is not explicitly stated in the instructions of the problem, the box-
shape that is created by the organizational pattern of the dots initially prevents subjects 
from drawing lines outside of the square (Newell & Simon, 1972; Weisberg & Alba, 
1981). In order to reach the correct solution, the problem space must be restructured in a 
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way that “allows” solvers to draw lines beyond the square. Chein et al. found that spatial 
WMC predicted this tendency to draw outside the box—a breakthrough that is necessary 
but not sufficient to solving. Although spatial WMC only predicted solving in a version 
of the task with hints, these results can be interpreted as support for the contribution of 
WMC via controlled search of numerous nine-dot problem representations. Together, 
then, all of these studies suggest that WMC plays a key role in insight problem solving, 
perhaps similar to its role in analytical problem solving, by allowing a more effective 
controlled search of the potential problem representations and in maintaining information 
relevant to the goal of the task.  
WMC has also been found to positively predict performance on the Remote 
Associates Task—a verbal reasoning task that is commonly used to measure verbal and 
fluid abilities and sometimes used to measure insight and creativity. Typically, in the 
Remote Associates Task, subjects are presented with three words (e.g., eight, skate, stick) 
and must come up with a fourth word that creates a compound word with each of the 
prompts (e.g., “figure”). What makes a Remote Associates Task difficult is when subjects 
come up with a word that will make a compound word with one or two of the prompts, 
but not all of them. Kane et al. (2004) found positive correlations between six measures 
of WMC and a Remote Associates Task, ranging from small to medium (rs = .06 to .28; 
although in this experiment the Remote Associates Task was used as a measure of verbal 
reasoning, rather than creativity). Ricks, Turley-Ames, & Wiley (2007) also found a 
positive relationship between WMC and a modified version of the Remote Associates 
Task, but not for people with strong prior knowledge (e.g., baseball players). In two 
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experiments, subjects completed WMC measure(s), a Remote Associates Task, and 
answered questions about their baseball knowledge. This Remote Associates Task was 
different from what has been used in other studies. In the version of the Remote 
Associates Task used for this study, the first two prompts (e.g., wild, dark) could be 
completed with a baseball-related word (e.g., pitch), however the third word would not fit 
that same pattern (e.g., sense). They found that in the neutral Remote Associates Task, 
WMC was positively correlated with proportion of correct solutions, regardless of 
baseball knowledge. Again, in the baseball-misleading Remote Associates Task, WMC 
was positively correlated with proportion of correct solutions; however, this time it was 
qualified by a significant interaction. People who had higher WMC and greater baseball 
knowledge actually performed worse than people with lesser baseball knowledge. Ricks 
et al. interpreted these results to mean that a higher WMC, or a more controlled attention, 
is beneficial for creative problem solving, except in the case of when prior knowledge 
activates an incorrect answer. When this happens, having more controlled attention is 
disadvantageous because it only helps the person focus more intensely on the wrong 
answer. 
 Although there is not much work that has directly assessed the relationship 
between WMC and divergent thinking, there is a growing literature that evaluates the 
relationship between general fluid intelligence and creativity. General fluid intelligence is 
the domain-free ability to reason through novel problems (Carroll, 1993; Horn & Cattell, 
1967), usually analytical ones, such as in the Ravens Progressive Matrices test (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 2003). In addition, general fluid intelligence correlates strongly with 
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WMC (typically around .70 - .80; see Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; Oberauer, 
Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süβ, 2005); this association, according to an executive attention 
perspective, is thought in part to reflect a shared, domain-general executive attention 
ability (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, 
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Therefore, while I do not consider WMC and general fluid 
intelligence to be one in the same, the aspects of general fluid intelligence that have been 
found to be important in creativity (e.g., inhibition) might be those that are shared also 
with WMC’s executive aspects.  
 Recent work finds that general fluid intelligence correlates positively with 
creativity in divergent thinking, alternative-uses, tasks (typically around .35 – .45 at the 
latent level; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia, 2008). Nusbaum and 
Silvia’s latent-variable analyses indicated, in their Study 1, that the relationship between 
general fluid intelligence and creativity was mediated by the executive process of 
switching between categories of uses (i.e., number of categories) but not clustering (i.e., 
number of words produced in each category). In their Study 2, half of the subjects were 
given a strategy to improve performance in the divergent thinking task, which involved 
disassembling the object and reassembling it. Instead of diminishing the effect of general 
fluid intelligence on creativity, instructing strategies amplified it, such that fluid 
intelligence better predicted performance on the divergent thinking task in the strategy 
group than in the control group (Nusbaum & Silvia, Study 2). Nusbaum and Silvia 
suggested that executive abilities are required to maintain a strategy in memory and use it 
effectively; therefore, those high in fluid intelligence will be able to do this successfully 
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while those who are low in fluid intelligence will not. Gilhooly et al. (2007) suggests that 
this relationship stems from the prerequisite ability to inhibit commonplace ideas in the 
pursuit of inventing creative ones.  
The Costs of Executive Control to Insight and Creativity 
 Several studies have found that people with lower WMC are more likely to mind-
wander inappropriately (i.e., when the task at hand requires concentration) than are those 
with higher WMC (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013). Mind wandering is argued, by some theorists, to be automatically 
triggered by environmental and mental cues, and to represent a failure of the executive 
control system to block interference from thoughts unrelated to the ongoing task (McVay 
& Kane, 2010). In other words, mind wandering occurs when a person fails to inhibit off-
task thoughts, pulling attention away from the current task, resulting in more errors in the 
task (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009). Based on these negative consequences associated with 
attention control failure, one might predict that mind wandering would be harmful to 
performance in cognitively demanding tasks such as insight problem solving and 
creativity.  
 Alternatively, some have suggested that mind wandering may be beneficial for 
insight and creativity (Baars, 2010; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Informal support for this idea can be found in countless anecdotes that illustrate fruitful 
mind wandering during an incubation period, a modern example of which includes 
chemist Kary Mullis solving the problem of how to amplify a target sequence of DNA 
(Mullis, 1998). In 1983, Mullis was driving through the mountains of California, 
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pondering the principles of DNA replication when he was suddenly struck with insight at 
mile marker 46.58 on Highway 128. His realization of how to target a specific portion of 
DNA and then replicate it exponentially would eventually lead to the development of 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and secure his 1993 Nobel Prize in chemistry.  
 Indirect evidence from the incubation literature also supports a role for mind 
wandering in insight and creative problem solving. Over the years, dozens of studies have 
evaluated the effects of various incubation tasks (i.e., taking a break from an initial task 
to work on another task, before returning to the initial task) on insight problem solving 
and creativity. Some have found that an incubation period inserted into a problem is 
beneficial to subsequent creative problem solving (known as the “incubation effect”), 
while others have failed to find this effect. In an attempt to specify the factors that 
contribute to a successful incubation period, a recent meta-analysis categorized studies by 
problem type (e.g., creative, visual insight, or linguistic insight problems) and incubation 
task demands (e.g., rest, low cognitive demand, high cognitive demand), among other 
variables (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Incubation periods filled with a low cognitive demand 
task were more beneficial for subsequent performance on creativity tasks than were high 
cognitive demand incubation tasks (although, there were not many data points to meta-
analyze for the creativity problems; Sio & Ormerod). Likewise, incubation periods filled 
with a low cognitive load were optimal for both visual and verbal insight problems, 
compared to rest (Sio & Ormerod).  
 Based on these findings, Schooler et al. (2011) argued that an incubation task with 
low cognitive demands would allow abundant opportunities for mind wandering, whereas 
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a task with high demands would not. In fact, in basic mind wandering research, low 
demand tasks yield higher mind-wandering rates than do high demand tasks (Smallwood, 
Nind, & O’Connor, 2009); therefore, these results suggest that mind wandering during a 
low-demand incubation period could be beneficial for creative problem solving. In 
addition, Smallwood and Schooler (2006) draw parallels between incubation processes 
and mind wandering, suggesting that the suddenness of insight “may sometimes occur 
because mind wandering addresses more remote goals (e.g., discerning the solution to a 
heretofore unsolved problem)” (Smallwood & Schooler, p. 956; see also Schooler et al., 
2011). But, not all mind wandering is created equal—according to Smallwood, 
McSpadden, and Schooler (2008), tuning out (mind wandering with awareness) may be 
especially beneficial for insight and creativity, as compared to zoning out (mind 
wandering without awareness). They argue that even if a person has creative insight, if it 
occurred while the person was zoning out, it may go unnoticed. Instead, tuning out 
presumably provides the benefits of mind wandering while still allowing the person to 
recognize that a creative insight has occurred.  
 In the midst of data collection for my second experiment, Baird and colleagues 
(2012) published a paper apparently demonstrating that mind wandering during an 
incubation period was beneficial for creative problem solving. Their study compared 
different types of incubation tasks—an undemanding task, a demanding task, rest, and no 
break—during a divergent thinking task. Among other things, they hypothesized that 
subjects would mind wander more in the undemanding task compared to the demanding 
task, and would therefore show greater improvement in creativity from pre- to post-
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incubation. At the end of each incubation period, and before returning to working on the 
divergent thinking task, subjects reported on a 1–5 scale how frequently they were mind 
wandering during that incubation period. Although Baird and colleagues did not test (or, 
at least, report) the effect of mind wandering during the incubation period on improved 
creativity, they did find that the condition with the undemanding incubation task—the 
condition that reported the most mind wandering in a retrospective questionnaire—was 
the only condition to show significant improvement in creativity from pre- to post-
incubation. In addition, a general propensity measure of daydreaming in daily life 
(Imaginal Process Inventory, Daydreaming Frequency subscale; Singer & Antrobus, 
1972) positively correlated (r around .20) with post-incubation creativity scores, 
collapsing across all experimental groups. Thus, Baird and colleagues concluded that 
mind wandering is beneficial for creative problem solving. 
Although Baird et al. are the only investigators to date to examine the influence of 
mind wandering on creativity, other research has implicated the benefits of decreased 
attentional control in creative success. Jarosz, Colflesh, and Wiley (2012) equated two 
groups of subjects on WMC using an operation span task, then left one group entirely 
sober and had the other group consume .88g/kg of body weight in vodka. An hour later, 
subjects completed another operation span task and then worked on a Remote Associates 
Task. While the sober group showed practice effects on the operation span task, the 
intoxicated group did not, suggesting decreased attentional control in those who 
consumed alcohol. In the Remote Associates Task, the intoxicated group solved more 
Remote Associates Task problems, did so faster, and was more likely to report that they 
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had experienced insight. Jarosz et al. interpret these results to suggest that a decreased 
attentional control (i.e., a more diffuse attentional state) due to inebriation, as 
demonstrated by a lack of improvement in the operation span task, is beneficial for 
creative problem solving in the Remote Associates Task. 
In another study, Aiello, Jarosz, Cushen, and Wiley (2012) found that taking a 
less-analytical approach to solving Remote Associates Task problems was significantly 
more successful than taking an analytical approach. Specifically, subjects who were 
given a “use your gut” instruction before completing Remote Associates Task problems 
performed better on the task compared to subjects who did not receive the “use your gut” 
instruction. The authors suggest that the “use your gut” instruction caused a reduced 
attentional control in subjects, leading to the conclusion that reduced attentional control is 
beneficial for solving creativity problems, such as the Remote Associates Task.  
Other, tangentially-related, work also provides support for the argument that a 
lack of executive control is helpful for insightful and creative thinking. For example, 
White and Shah (2006, 2011) have found that adults with ADHD—a disorder with 
symptoms including reduced inhibitory control—perform better in divergent thinking 
tasks and have more real-world creative achievements than their non-ADHD 
counterparts. Another study looked at the relationship between time of day and problem 
solving and found that non-optimal time of day—which is also affiliated with reduced 
inhibitory control—was beneficial for solving insight problems but not analytical 
problems (Wieth & Zacks, 2011). Although neither of these studies measured attention 
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control directly, they both draw conclusions that echo support for executive control’s 
harmful influence on insight and creativity.  
Flexibility in Executive Control 
A third perspective, which combines these ideas, might suggest that WMC 
predicts flexibility in mind wandering, depending on context. That is, people high in 
WMC may be able to focus their attention (and reduce mind wandering) or unfocus their 
attention (and increase mind wandering) depending on what is most beneficial for the 
context they are in. Specifically, I predict that the correlation between WMC and mind 
wandering will be negative (around -.20; consistent with previous research) in the context 
of the stand-alone attention-demanding tasks, but closer to zero (or perhaps positive) in 
the context of the incubation tasks.   
Such a flexibility hypothesis seems reasonable because the typical, negative 
association between WMC and mind wandering is not always seen. According to an 
executive control perspective, individual differences in WMC should be most 
pronounced when a task is difficult and requires concentration (Engle & Kane, 2004). If 
relevant goals and information are difficult to maintain while trying to complete a task, 
keeping that information in mind while keeping irrelevant information out will require 
greater executive control. So, if mind wandering is measured in the lab during a 
considerably easy task, which doesn’t require much concentration to perform, there may 
be no relationship between WMC and mind wandering, or even a positive one (e.g., 
Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). A 
parallel example of this has also been seen outside of the lab in daily life research. Unlike 
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typical lab tasks, activities in daily life vary substantially in terms of how much effort and 
concentration is required, from washing the dishes to mentally calculating how much tip 
to leave for the waitress. In their study, Kane and colleagues (2007) used palm pilots to 
spontaneously probe subjects about their thought content and context several times a day 
for one week. Their results showed a negative association between WMC and mind 
wandering, but only when concentration on the task was high. That is, when 
concentration was high, people with greater WMC mind-wandered less, but when 
concentration was low, people with greater WMC mind-wandered more. If concentration 
was not included in the model, however, WMC was unrelated to mind wandering. This 
finding suggests that, because concentration has never been taken into consideration in 
the laboratory, previous studies in the lab may have underestimated the relationship 
between working memory capacity and mind wandering. 
The Present Work 
 Overall, the literature seems to be conflicted in its suggestions for how WMC and 
mind wandering might affect insight problem solving and creativity. On the one hand, the 
executive-control perspective predicts that higher WMC, and therefore a more focused 
attention, will benefit insight and creativity. On the other hand, the lack-of-executive-
control perspective predicts that more mind wandering, and therefore a broader, 
unfocused attention, will be better for insight and creativity (c.f., White & Shah, 2006; 
2011). Alternatively, a third prediction takes both of these perspectives into account, 
whereby WMC predicts flexibility in mind wandering, depending on context. In other 
words, people with higher WMC are better able to focus their attention and limit mind 
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wandering when they need to, but they can also unfocus their attention and allow mind 
wandering when necessary or helpful, such as during an incubation period (Colflesh & 
Conway, 2007; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001).   
 In order to measure the impact of WMC and mind wandering on insight and 
creativity, I first created a composite WMC score for each person from two WMC tasks, 
operation span and symmetry span (Conway et al., 2005), and obtained baseline mind-
wandering rates from a stand-alone, attention-demanding task. Two divergent thinking 
tasks and two insight problems were used to measure creativity and insight, respectively. 
An incubation period was inserted into the middle of each creativity and insight task, 
during which subjects responded to mind wandering probes regarding their current 
thoughts while completing an ongoing task that was comparable to the baseline measure.  
 The primary goal of this research is to examine the relationships among WMC, 
mind wandering state, insight, and creativity. Specifically, this study will assess the 
extent to which individual differences in WMC predict people’s ability to control their 
attention, think creatively, and solve insight problems. I hypothesize that there will be an 
interaction between WMC and task context on mind wandering, such that people with 
lower WMC will mind wander more than people with higher WMC when there is no 
apparent reason to mind wander, but high spans will mind wander more than low spans 
during the incubation period when there is a potential reason to mind wander.  
 Previous work in the lab has shown a relationship between mind wandering and 
working memory capacity. Research into daily life has not found a raw correlation 
between mind wandering and working memory capacity; however, there is an apparent 
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interaction between working memory capacity and concentration in predicting mind 
wandering in everyday life. This suggests that researchers could be underestimating the 
effect between mind wandering and working memory capacity in the lab by omitting 
concentration measures. In the present study, I measured concentration in order to test the 
interaction between it and working memory when predicting mind wandering. From an 
executive attention perspective, working memory should differentially predict mind 
wandering in conditions where concentration is high. That is, people with lower working 








 Assuming that an incubation period is beneficial to insight and creativity because 
it allows for mind wandering, I chose two tasks that I knew provided a supportive 
environment for off-task thought: the SART and the n-back. Previous work has 
consistently shown that subjects mind wander approximately 30–50% of the time while 
working on the SART (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; 2012a; McVay, Meier, Touron, & 
Kane, 2013). In addition, I chose the n-back because it has been used successfully as an 
incubation task before (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006) and has been shown to induce 
comparable mind-wandering rates to my stand-alone measure, the SART (McVay, Meier, 
Touron, & Kane).  
Methods 
Subjects 
 Undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) earned partial credit toward a course requirement 
for their participation in each of two 120 min sessions. One hundred and seventy-three 
undergraduates completed the first session of the experiment; of those, 142 students 
returned to complete the second session as well. In order to minimize attrition, we gave 
the majority of the credits upon the completion of the second session. Unless stated 
otherwise, data analyses only included students who completed both sessions.  
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Working Memory Span Tasks 
 We assessed WMC with two “complex span” tasks that are commonly used to 
measure WMC in younger adults (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). Both 
tasks—operation span and symmetry span—required subjects to perform a processing 
task while simultaneously remembering short lists of other, unrelated information in 
serial order. Each of the span tasks began with three practice blocks: the first block gave 
the subject an opportunity to practice the memory component of the task for 4 trials (two 
trials of set size two and two trials of set size three), the second block allowed for practice 
of the processing component of the task for 15 trials, and the third block combined both 
the memory component and the processing component in order to familiarize the subject 
with how the actual task would run for 8 trials. Following the third practice block, 
subjects were notified that they would begin the actual task. After the practice blocks, 
response deadlines for the processing task were used to ensure that the subjects did not 
rehearse the memory items during the processing component of the task. Response 
deadlines were calculated using the response times attained during the processing 
practice block (M + 2.5 SDs). If the subject exceeded the response deadline on any one 
trial, the task moved on to the next trial and counted that item as an error. 
 Operation span. In this task, subjects were asked to solve a math problem (e.g., (9 
÷ 3) + 2 = ?) and then evaluate the solution presented on the next screen (e.g., 6; true or 
false) while remembering a subsequently presented letter (see Unsworth et al., 2005). 
After three to seven of these equation–letter pairs, subjects saw the twelve possible letters 
(F, K, P, S, H, L, Q, T, J, N, R, and Y) and used the computer mouse to recall the letters 
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in the order in which they had appeared. A total of 15 trials, ranging from set size three to 
seven (three of each set size), appeared in random order. 
 Symmetry span. In this task, subjects evaluated the vertical symmetry of a black-
and-white 8×8 grid pattern while remembering the location of a subsequently presented 
red square within a 4×4 grid (see Kane et al., 2004). After two to five symmetry-square 
pairs, subjects saw an empty 4×4 grid and used the computer mouse to recall the 
locations of the red squares in the order in which they had appeared. A total of twelve 
trials, ranging from set size two to five (three of each set size), appeared in random order. 
Mind Wandering Assessment: Ongoing Tasks and Thought Probes 
 Mind wandering was measured by randomly probing subjects about their thoughts 
during ongoing cognitive tasks. The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
served as a stand-alone measure and four different versions of the n-back served as the 
incubation tasks. Each took about 20 min to complete. 
 SART. This is a go/no-go task in which subjects viewed a sequence of words, 
presented one at a time, and had to decide whether each was an animal or a food (animals 
that are typically foods, such as chickens, were not included; see McVay & Kane, 2009). 
Each word was presented for 300 ms, followed by a 900 ms mask. If the word was an 
animal, subjects responded by pressing the space bar as quickly as they can (making up 
88.9% of the 900 trials). If the word was a food, subjects withheld response, and 
therefore pressed no key (making up 11.1% of the 900 trials). Following 60% of the 
critical, no-go stimuli, subjects were presented with a thought probe, asking them to 
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characterize the content of their thoughts in the moment before the thought probe 
appeared (see below for details).  
N-back task. Subjects viewed a sequence of words, presented one at a time, and 
had to decide whether the current word is the same word that was presented two words 
back. If the word is the same (e.g., green, blue, green), subjects responded by pressing the 
space bar as quickly as they could (making up 25% of the 336 trials). If the word was not 
the same, subjects withheld response, and therefore pressed no key (making up 75% of 
the 336 trials). A subset of these non-target trials, called lure trials (making up 21% of the 
336 trials), presented either 1-back matches (e.g., blue, green, green) or 3-back matches 
(e.g., green, blue, purple, green). Each word was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 
fixation cross for 2500 ms. While working on the task, subjects were periodically 
presented with a thought probe (just as in the SART), asking them to characterize the 
content of their thoughts immediately prior to the probe. Three thought probes were 
presented during each of the seven blocks, of which two thought probes were presented 
immediately after a target stimulus. Versions of this task functioned as an incubation-
period task for the two insight problems and the two creativity tasks.  
Specifically, there were four versions of the n-back task, presenting different 
stimuli: colors, countries, parts of the body, and musical instruments (see Appendix A for 
full list of items). I selected the words in each version based on categorical norms from 
Battig and Montague (1969) and Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004).  
Mind wandering probes. Each probe screen asked, “What were you just thinking 
about?” Subjects’ responses were conveyed via key press and the on-screen choices 
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included: (1) the current task; (2) my performance on the task; (3) off-task: tune out 
(knew it all along); (4) off-task: zone out (without knowing it). Simply put, “tuning out” 
is when a person is fully aware that he is mind-wandering, and zoning out is when a 
person doesn’t realize that he is mind- wandering until something in the environment 
(like the thought probe) interrupts him or he catches himself. Specifically, subjects were 
told in the instructions that: 
 
During this experiment you will be asked at various points whether your 
attention is firmly directed towards the task, or alternatively you may be 
aware of other things than just the task.  
 
Occasionally you may find as you are reading the text that you begin 
thinking about something completely unrelated to what you are reading; 
this is what we refer to as “mind wandering.” We believe there are two 
forms of mind wandering:  
 
TUNING OUT: Sometimes when your mind wanders, you are aware that 
your mind has drifted, but for whatever reason you still continue to read. 
This is what we refer to as “tuning out”—i.e., when your mind wanders 
and you know it all along. 
 
ZONING OUT: Other times when your mind wanders, you don’t realize 
that your thoughts have drifted away from the text until you catch 
yourself. This is what we refer to as “zoning out”—i.e., when your mind 
wanders, but you don’t realize this until you catch it. (Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007, p. 533) 
 
This distinction between tuning out and zoning out may be important because it is 
possible that even if a creative insight has occurred while a person is zoning out, it may 
go unnoticed (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008), and so only tune outs might 
be beneficial to creativity. It is not clear, however, whether this distinction between 
tuning out and zoning out is capturing anything more than a gradation from less-
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distracted to more-distracted.1 Therefore, responses of either “3” (tuning out) or “4” 
(zoning out) were both scored as a task-unrelated thought (i.e., TUT), or a mind 
wandering experience. Responses of “2”, reflective of thoughts about one’s own 
performance, were considered as “task related interference” (TRI; Smallwood, Riby, 
Heim, & Davies, 2006) that does not represent either fully on-task or off-task thought 
(McVay & Kane, 2009; 2012a; 2012b; McVay et al., 2013). My primary dependent 
variable of interest here, then, is overall TUT rate in each task; however, secondary 
analyses will distinguish between tuning out and zoning out.  
Concentration probes. In addition to being asked about mind wandering, subjects 
were also asked about how much they were trying to concentrate on the current task (i.e., 
either the SART or the n-back). Immediately following each mind wandering probe, 
subjects saw a screen that said “I was trying to concentrate on the current task,” along 
with a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
Insight Problems 
Subjects were given an insight problem to work on for 3 min. Regardless of 
whether or not they solved the problem during this pre-incubation period, subjects then 
switched to an incubation task (the n-back) for 20 min. If subjects had solved the problem 
during the pre-incubation period, then the task ended at the conclusion of the incubation 
                                                          
1 Schooler and colleagues have suggested in numerous studies (e.g., Schooler, Reichle, & 
Halpern, 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007) that there is a qualitative 
distinction between tuning out and zoning out; however, research has only established a 
single dissociation, where performance in an ongoing task is worse while zoning out than 
tuning out. Therefore, it is not clear to me that this is a valid distinction (i.e., that it’s 
different from simply being less versus more off task) and so I will proceed with caution 
while using these terms. 
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period. If subjects had not solved the problem during the pre-incubation period, then they 
returned to the original insight problem for an additional 5 min. The two insight problems 
used were the coins problem (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Ormerod, Macgregor, & Chronicle, 
2002) and the pigpen problem, (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 
1993; for illustrations of both problems, see Figure 1A and 1B) which were chosen based 
on a pilot study. Both problems are considered pure insight problems using Weisberg’s 
(1995) taxonomy, which means that they require a restructuring of the original problem 
representation in order to be solved. In the coins problem, subjects had to reorganize an 
arrangement of eight coins so that each coin touched exactly three other coins. In order to 
reach the correct solution, subjects must restructure their two-dimensional perspective of 
the problem and stack two of the coins on top of the remaining coins. Likewise, in the 
pigpen problem, subjects were asked to add two square enclosures to a picture of nine 
pigs in a pen so that each pig is in a pen by itself. In order to reach the correct solution, 
subjects must restructure how they think of a square and place one square in side of a 
diamond (i.e., a square turned 45 degrees).  
 
 
Figure 1A. Coin Insight Problem (Ormerod et al., 2002). There are 8 coins in this picture. 




Figure 1B. Pigpen Insight Problem (Schooler et al., 1993). Nine pigs are kept in a square 
pen. Build two more square enclosures that would put each pig in a pen by itself. 
 
Subjects saw the problems presented on a computer screen, one at a time, for a 
total of eight minutes each (if they did not solve the problem prior to incubation). During 
this time, subjects were given a blank piece of paper to work out their thoughts. If 
subjects thought they had the correct answer before time had expired, they pressed a key 
on the computer keyboard and a screen appeared instructing them to show their answer to 
the experimenter. The experimenter then checked the answer and recorded the accuracy 
of the response by pressing Y if the answer was correct and N if the answer was 
incorrect. If the answer was correct, subjects immediately moved on to the next part of 
the task; if the answer was not correct, the problem re-appeared (indicating to subjects 
that their previous response was incorrect) and subjects were given a new piece of scrap 
paper and allowed to work on the problem until time was up. I allowed this kind of 
feedback (and no more) to ensure that subjects did not give up after falsely believing they 




Because the placement of false constraints plays such an important role in insight 
problems, the analytical problems were used as filler items to prevent subjects from 
noticing a pattern in the insight problems. My pilot study, which evaluated 11 different 
insight problems, suggested that once subjects realized that there was a “trick” to solving 
the problems, subsequent problems were more likely to be solved and were reported to be 
easier. Here, subjects tried to solve the crime problem (Schooler et al., 1993) and one 
free-response item adapted from the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (i.e., item 
23; Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003), presented on the computer screen, each for 3 min. In 
the crime problem, subjects were presented with statements from four suspects, only one 
of which is veridical. The problem stated “The police were convinced that Andy, Bill, 
Carl, or Dave had committed a crime. Each of the suspects made a statement, but only 
one of the statements was true. Andy said, ‘I didn’t do it.’ Bill said, ‘Andy is lying.’ Carl 
said, ‘Bill is lying.’ Dave said, ‘Bill did it.’ Who is telling the truth and who committed 
the crime?” Given this information, subjects were instructed to write down on a piece of 
paper who was telling the truth and who committed the crime. In the Ravens problem, 
subjects were presented with a 3×3 matrix of abstract designs with the bottom right 
picture missing. Using the patterns throughout the rest of the matrix, the subject had to 
induce the rule that governed the progression of the figures left-to-right and top-to-
bottom and then draw on a piece of paper what the missing piece of the matrix should 
look like. The procedure for these problems was identical to the insight problems (but 
without an incubation period).   
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Creativity (Divergent Thinking) Tasks 
Two versions of the “alternative uses” task of divergent thinking (e.g., Guilford, 
1967) were used to measure individual differences in creativity. In both versions, subjects 
were asked to generate as many creative uses for an everyday object as they can, for a 
total of 10 min. After 5 min on the task, subjects switched to the incubation task (the n-
back) for approximately 20 min, and then switched back to the same alternative uses task 
for another 5 min. In one version of the task, subjects generated creative uses for a brick, 
and in the other version, a knife. Following recent work with divergent thinking tasks 
which strive to assess creative thinking (e.g., Silvia et al., 2008), my instructions 
emphasized that subjects should list creative, clever, original, unusual, and uncommon 
uses that are unlike any uses that they had seen or heard of before. After time was up, 
subjects were presented on-screen with a list of their responses and were asked to select 
what they thought were their two best answers. Subjects were asked to do this at three 
different times: once for their pre-incubation responses, once for their post-incubation 
responses, and once for all of their responses combined (pre- and post-incubation). 
Asking subjects for their top two responses allowed me to use top-two scoring, in 
addition to averaging across all of the responses a subject came up with in order to 
achieve an average creativity measure. More information about scoring will be provided 




Subjects individually completed two 120 minute sessions. All tasks were 
presented on computers. In the first session, subjects completed the SART, one of the 
alternative uses tasks, symmetry span, and one of the insight problems. In the second 
session, they completed a demographic survey, the crime problem, operation span, the 
other insight problem, the other version of the alternative uses task, and the Ravens 
problem. For both sessions, the order of the tasks was fixed for all subjects and 
administered in the aforementioned order. The insight problems and alternative uses tasks 
were counterbalanced so that half of subjects saw the coins and brick problem in session 
one and half saw the pigpen and knife problem in session one.  
Scoring 
 Working memory tasks. Both the operation span task and symmetry span task 
were scored using partial credit load scoring (Conway et al., 2005), in which the total 
number of items recalled in correct serial position is summed across the task. These span 
scores were then individually converted into z-scores, based on our lab database of N = 
3393 UNCG students, and then averaged to create a WMC composite.  
 Mind wandering tasks. Off-task thought reports (i.e., tuning out and zoning out) 
were categorized as mind wandering. The total rate of mind wandering responses to 
thought probes was calculated for each incubation n-back task and the SART. Initially, 
tuning out and zoning out were grouped together as task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs), but 
supplementary analyses, which are secondary to this study, will contrast tuning out and 
zoning out as two specific types of mind wandering.  
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Insight problems. Insight problems were scored as either 0 (incorrect) or 1 
(correct).2 
Creativity tasks. Three raters (the author and two other psychology graduate 
students who study creativity) scored each subject’s individual responses on a scale of 1–
5. For rating purposes, the judges were told to view creative ideas as having three facets: 
they are uncommon, they are remotely linked to everyday objects and ideas, and they are 
often clever. The raters saw all of the responses, from all subjects, from both experiment 
one and two, presented in alphabetical order in a spreadsheet, independent of any 




Inter-rater Reliability for Divergent Thinking Tasks Across Experiments 
 
 Brick Task Knife Task 
 Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 1 Rater 2 
Brick Task     
   Rater 1 1.000    
   Rater 2 0.408 1.000   
   Rater 3 0.454 0.417   
Knife Task     
   Rater 1   1.000  
   Rater 2   0.543 1.000 
   Rater 3   0.372 0.395 
Note. Brick α = 0.688, Knife α = 0.689 
 
                                                          
2 Since experimenters logged the accuracy of the insight responses by hand into the 
computer, there was opportunity for human error. To reduce this error, the responses in 
the output were compared to the hard copy of the subjects’ answers (i.e., the drawings) by 
four different research assistants, entirely independent from one another. Then, those 
were compared to one another to confirm accuracy. Any discrepancies were decided 
upon by the author. 
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After all of the rating was complete, creativity was calculated for each subject in 
three different ways: (1) an average score was calculated by taking an average of all the 
ratings of one particular subject’s responses; (2) a top-two score was calculated by 
averaging the ratings for the two responses that a subject indicated as the two best; (3) a 
max-two score was calculated by averaging the two responses that were given the highest 
mean ratings by the raters. For all of these creativity scores, ratings were first averaged 
across raters for each response, and then across all of the responses for each person. 
Previous work has found that average scoring is a bit more reliable than top-two scoring, 
but top-two scoring has greater validity than average scoring, insofar as it better predicts 
creative personalities (Silvia et al., 2008). I added max-two scoring in order to see 
whether it related to WMC and mind wandering differently than top-two scoring. In top-
two scoring, subjects must be able to evaluate the creativity of their responses after 
generating them, but in max-two scoring, the evaluation of creativity is done only by the 
raters.3 
Results 
 For all analyses, I report null hypothesis significance tests with an alpha of .05 
and Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size. 
                                                          
3 Because RAs coded all of the subjects’ responses for whether or not the subject had 
indicated it was one of their best two responses, there was once again a potential for 
human error. In order to minimize this, responses were coded by four different people, 
entirely independent from one another. Then, those were compared to one another to 




Data from subjects were omitted from analyses for scoring less than 85% on the 
processing component of either span task (18 people) and exceptionally poor 
performance on the tasks with embedded thought probes (SART and/or n-back tasks; 4 
people); “poor performance” outliers were determined by collapsing non-target accuracy 
across n-back tasks and excluding anyone who had an accuracy of ≤ 75% in either the 
collapsed n-back or on the non-target trials of the stand-alone SART (mean accuracy and 
reaction times can be found in Appendix B). A total of 120 people were included for 
analyses, ranging in age from 18-29 years (M = 19.12, 65.8% female). By self-report, the 
final sample’s racial composition was 58.3% White, 28.3% Black, 5.8% Asian, 5.0% 
Multiracial, and 2.5% Other. Additionally, regarding self-reported ethnicity, 5% self-
identified as Latino/Hispanic.  
Primary Analyses  
Analyses that are central to my hypotheses will be included in the current section, 
while secondary questions and exploratory analyses will be presented in the next section. 
Descriptive statistics for WMC and TUT measures can be found in Table 2 and 
correlations among these variables can be found in Table 3. Standardized WMC scores 
were normally distributed with a mean close to zero. In addition, the individual WMC 
tasks (operation span and symmetry span) correlated fairly well, which allowed me to 
collapse across the two tasks to create composite WMC z-scores. Comparing TUT rates 
across tasks, people appeared to consistently mind wander about 40% of the time across 
tasks, regardless of whether the task stood alone (i.e., the SART) or was inserted as an 
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incubation period for another task (i.e., n-back). A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated no statistical differences in average TUT rates across any of the five 
different tasks, F(4, 592) = 0.713, p = .583, MSE = 0.059, ηp2 = .005). Furthermore, TUT 
rates correlated significantly across all pairwise tasks, rs = .24 to .65 (see Table 3), 
suggesting that mind wandering is also consistent across people.   
 
Table 2   
 
Experiment 1 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind 
Wandering 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Sspan Z 120 -0.062 0.975 -2.742 1.832 -0.396 -0.094 
Ospan Z 120  0.061 0.949 -3.279 1.546 -0.941  1.258 
WMC Z 120 -0.001 0.782 -1.637 1.589 -0.253 -0.613 
SART TO 119  0.237 0.143  0 0.650  0.481 -0.135 
SART ZO 119  0.130 0.113  0 0.483  0.963  0.604 
SART TUT 119  0.367 0.196  0.033 0.800  0.203 -1.072 
Coins TO 120  0.266 0.216  0 0.952  1.116  1.147 
Coins ZO 120  0.146 0.153  0 0.667  1.184  1.047 
Coins TUT 120  0.413 0.260  0 1  0.272 -0.750 
PigPen TO 119  0.246 0.209  0 1  1.296  2.390 
PigPen ZO 119  0.153 0.167  0 0.857  1.833  4.206 
PigPen TUT 119  0.399 0.252  0 1  0.396 -0.489 
Brick TO 120  0.246 0.193  0 1  1.402  2.922 
Brick ZO 120  0.151 0.163  0 0.857  1.471  2.540 
Brick TUT 120  0.397 0.236  0 1  0.438 -0.462 
Knife TO 119  0.257 0.224  0 1  1.180  1.210 
Knife ZO 119  0.156 0.159  0 0.905  1.669  4.059 
Knife TUT 119  0.413 0.261  0 1  0.432 -0.575 
Note. Z = Z scores based on database of over 3000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; SART = sustained attention response task; TO = tune outs; ZO = zone outs; 






Experiment 1 Correlations Among Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind Wandering 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Sspan Z 1.00          
2. Ospan Z  .32** 1.00         
3. WMC Z  .82**  .81** 1.00        
4. SART TOs -.03 -.05 -.05 1.00       
5. SART ZOs -.03  .04 .01  .16  1.00      
6. SART TUTs -.04 -.01 -.03  .82**  .70** 1.00     
7. Coins TOs -.20* -.10 -.19*  .27**  .16  .29** 1.00    
8. Coins ZOs -.09 -.12 -.13  .05  .41**  .27** -.04 1.00   
9. Coins TUTs -.22* -.15 -.23*  .25**  .38**  .40**  .81**  .56** 1.00  
10. Pigpen TOs -.15 -.12 -.17  .32**  .17  .33**  .39**  .01  .33** 1.00 
11. Pigpen ZOs -.04 -.08 -.07 -.01  .48**  .27**  .02  .52**  .32** -.11 
12. Pigpen TUTs -.15 -.15 -.19*  .26**  .46**  .45**  .33**  .35**  .48**  .75** 
13. Brick TOs -.06 -.01 -.05  .26**  .06  .23*  .61** -.05  .48**  .40** 
14. Brick ZOs  .02 -.06 -.03  .04  .41**  .26**  .02  .59**  .37**  .02 
15. Brick TUTs -.04 -.05 -.06  .24**  .33**  .36**  .52**  .37**  .65**  .34** 
16. Knife TOs -.10 -.15 -.15  .37**  .16  .36**  .23*  .19*  .30**  .55** 
17. Knife ZOs  .10  .05  .09 -.02  .50**  .28** -.05  .48**  .24** -.08 
18. Knife TUTs -.03 -.10 -.08  .31**  .44**  .48**  .17  .45**  .41**  .42** 
19. N-back TOs -.18 -.17 -.21*  .41**  .22*  .42**  .76**  .05  .66**  .80** 
20. N-back ZOs -.01 -.07 -.04  .03  .55**  .33** -.01  .79**  .46** -.05 





Table 3 (continued) 
 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Sspan Z           
2. Ospan Z           
3. WMC Z           
4. SART TOs           
5. SART ZOs           
6. SART TUTs           
7. Coins TOs           
8. Coins ZOs           
9. Coins TUTs           
10. Pigpen TOs           
11. Pigpen ZOs 1.00          
12. Pigpen TUTs  .57** 1.00         
13. Brick TOs -.05  .30** 1.00        
14. Brick ZOs  .53**  .37** -.13 1.00       
15. Brick TUTs  .32**  .50**  .73**  .59** 1.00      
16. Knife TOs  .03  .47**  .06  .00  .05 1.00     
17. Knife ZOs  .61**  .34** -.05  .53**  .33** -.11 1.00    
18. Knife TUTs  .40**  .61**  .02  .32**  .24**  .80**  .52** 1.00   
19. N-back TOs -.04  .64**  .69** -.02  .55**  .65** -.09  .49** 1.00  
20. N-back ZOs  .83**  .51** -.08  .82**  .50**  .05  .81**  .54** -.03 1.00 
21. N-back TUTs  .52**  .83**  .48**  .53**  .75**  .53**  .47**  .73**  .75**  .64** 
Note. Z = Z scores based on database of over 3000 people; WMC = working memory capacity; SART = sustained attention 
response task; TO = tune outs; ZO = zone outs; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts. 




In the coins problem, there were 9 pre-incubation solvers (7.5%), and only 7 post-
incubation solvers (5.8%), leaving 104 people who never solved the problem (86.7%). 
The pigpen problem also had 9 pre-incubation solvers (7.5%), 14 post-incubation solvers 
(11.7%), 96 people who never solved (80.0%), and one person who was excluded from 
pigpen analyses because he had seen the problem before (0.8%). Across all primary 
analyses involving either insight problem, people who solved pre-incubation were 
excluded. 
Inter-rater reliability for divergent-thinking scores across experiments was quite 
good for both brick (α = 0.69) and knife (α = 0.69; see Table 1; c.f., Silvia et al., 2008) 
tasks. In Experiment 1, overall creativity ratings (collapsed across both pre- and post-
incubation) in the brick task was correlated with overall creativity in the knife task, 
regardless of using average scoring, r(117) = .58, p < .001, top-two scoring, r(117) = .38, 
p < .001, or max-two scoring, r(117) = .59, p < .001. Therefore, for the creativity 
analyses, scores will be averaged across brick and knife in order to create one creativity 
measure. 
Is executive control helpful for insight and creativity? Based on the perspective 
that executive control is helpful for insight and creativity, WMC should correlate 
positively with insight and creativity. Regarding insight, people who solve the coins 
problem after incubation did not have a significantly higher WMC z-score (M = -.06, SD 
= 1.09) than did those who never solved (M = .02, SD = 0.77), t(109) = 0.24, p = .81, 
95% CI [-0.54, 0.69], d = 0.08; however, people who solved the pigpen problem after 




those who never solved (M = -.11, SD = 0.76), t(108) = -3.28, p = .001, 95% CI [-1.14, -
0.28], d = -0.93.  In addition, there was no correlation between WMC and post-incubation 
creativity scores on the divergent thinking tasks for average, r(114) = .01, p = .90, top-
two, r(114) = .07, p = .47, or max-two, r(114) = .03, p = .72 scoring (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 Correlation Scatter between WMC and Creativity (Average 
Scoring).  
 
Is lack of executive control helpful for insight and creativity? Based on the 
perspective that a lack of executive control is helpful for insight and creativity, TUT rates 




What I found, however, was that subjects who solved the coins insight problem after 
incubation did not mind wander significantly more than did those who never solved; if 
anything, they mind wandered somewhat less (M TUT rates = .35 [SD = 0.16] and .41 
[SD = 0.26], respectively), t(109) = 0.60, p = .55, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.26], d = 0.28. 
Similarly, subjects who solved the pigpen insight problem after incubation tended to have 
fewer TUTs during the pigpen incubation period (M TUT rate = .30, SD = 0.29) than did 
subjects who never solved the pigpen problem (M TUT rate = .42, SD = 0.24), but not 
significantly so, t(108) = 1.71, p = .09, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.26], d = 0.46. Focusing on the 
incubation period during the divergent-thinking tasks, I found no relation between mind 
wandering and post-incubation creativity for average, r(114) = -.08, p = .42, top-two, 





Figure 3. Experiment 1 Correlation Scatter between TUT Rates and Creativity (Average 
Scoring). 
 
Although WMC and TUT rates related inconsistently to insight and creativity, 
people who are high in WMC and TUT rates may be more insightful or creative. To test 
whether or not this interaction between WMC and TUT rates could predict insight, I ran 
two separate logistic regressions—one for coins and one for pigpen (see Table 4). In the 
logistic regression with post-incubation coins solving as the outcome measure, I first 
entered WMC and coins TUT rates at Step 1 and added the WMC x TUT interaction at 




the pigpen problem, with post-incubation pigpen solving as the outcome measure and 
pigpen TUT rates replacing coins TUT rates. This time, the interaction was statistically 
significant, but in the negative direction, suggesting that post-incubation pigpen solvers 
had higher WMC and lower pigpen TUT rates.  
 
Table 4  
 
Experiment 1 WMC x TUT Logistic Regression on Insight Problem Solving 
 
      95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 B SE Wald p Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Coins Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score -0.147 0.396   0.137 .711 0.863 0.397 1.877 
   Coins TUT Rate -0.283 0.430   0.435 .510 0.753 0.324 1.749 
   Constant -2.734 0.404 45.802 .000 0.065   
Block 2        
   WMC x TUT -0.428 0.426   1.010 .315 0.652 0.283 1.502 
Pigpen Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  1.058 0.386   7.497 .006 2.880 1.351 6.141 
   Pigpen TUT Rate -0.379 0.342   1.227 .685 0.685 0.350 1.339 
   Constant -2.357 0.402 34.397 .000 0.095   
Block 2        
   WMC x TUT -0.905 0.387   5.451 .020 0.405 0.189 0.865 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; Coins N = 111, 
Pigpen N = 110; all predictors are z-scores (for centering purposes). 
 
For the creativity analysis, I used average post-incubation creativity scoring as the 
outcome measure in a hierarchical linear regression with WMC and creativity TUT rates 
entered in at Step 1 and the interaction of the two (WMC x TUT) entered in at Step 2, but 





Table 5  
 
Experiment 1 WMC x TUT Hierarchical Linear Regression on Creativity 
 
      95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (Δ R2 = .006)        
   WMC z-score  0.002 0.029  0.006   0.068 .946 -0.056 0.059 
   Creativity TUT Rate -0.023 0.029 -0.075  -0.792 .430 -0.080 0.034 
   Constant  2.044 0.029  71.459 .000  1.987 2.101 
Block 2 (Δ R2 = .010)        
   WMC x TUT  0.034 0.031  0.102   1.086 .280 -0.028 0.095 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; all predictors 
are z-scores (for centering purposes). 
 
Does the correlation between WMC and TUTs vary by context? A third 
hypothesis was that the relation between WMC and mind-wandering rates would change 
depending on the task context, demonstrating flexibility in executive control. I predicted 
that mind-wandering rates would be lower for people with high WMC than for people 
with low WMC when there was no experimentally-induced reason to mind-wander (i.e., 
during the SART), but greater for those with high WMC compared to those with low 
WMC when there was an experimentally-induced reason to mind-wander (i.e., during the 
n-back incubation period). To test this, I statistically compared the correlation (Steiger, 
1980) between WMC and TUT rate during the SART (r = -.03) to the correlation 
between WMC and average TUT rate across the four incubation tasks (r = -.19). These 
two correlations did not differ significantly, t(114) = 1.81, p = .07; if anything, the pattern 
trended in the opposite direction of what I had predicted, with high spans mind 
wandering at about the same rate as low spans during the stand-alone SART, but less than 




 Does concentration moderate the relationship between WMC and TUTs? Based 
on previous research in daily life (Kane et al., 2007), I predicted that WMC would 
significantly moderate the relationship between TUT rate and concentration, such that 
people with lower WMC should TUT more than people with higher WMC when self-
reported concentration was high. For this analysis, I collapsed across all SART and n-
back tasks, measuring mind wandering on any given trial as either “0” (on task) or “1” 
(off task). Because the outcome measure was binary and the concentration responses 
(Level 1 data) were nested within subjects (Level 2 data), I used hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) for binary outcomes with a Bernoulli distribution to test my hypothesis 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The Level 1, within-subject variable—concentration—was 
group centered, and the Level 2, between-subject variable—WMC—was grand-mean 
centered. My model included fixed effects for concentration at Level 1 and fixed effects 
for WMC on the intercept and on the concentration slope (a WMC × concentration 
interaction) at Level 2. I also added a random effect for the intercept.  
Although I did find that concentration negatively predicted TUTs (β10 = -1.04, 
t(13975) = -18.91, p < 0.001; Table 6), WMC did not significantly predict TUTs (β01 = -
0.22, t(118) = -1.62, p = 0.11), and concentration did not moderate the association 
between WMC and TUTs (β11 = 0.02, t(13975) = 0.34, p = 0.74; see Figure 4). Finally, a 
significant person-level random effect on the intercept suggests that there were individual 






Experiment 1 WMC x Concentration Hierarchical Linear Model on Mind Wandering 
 
Fixed Effect Coefficient SE T-ratio d.f. p 
Intercept, β00 -0.036 0.122  -0.292 118 .771 
   WMC, β01 -0.218 0.135  -1.619 118 .108 
Concentration, β10 -1.044 0.055 -18.908 13975 .000 
   WMC, β11  0.022 0.067   0.336 13975 .737 
      
Random Effect χ2 SD Variance 
Component 
d.f. p 
Intercept, r0 2599.634 1.325 1.755 118 .000 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; calculated by averaging across operation span 
and symmetry span z-scores. In this analysis, the main effects of WMC and concentration 
are represented by β01 and β10, respectively, and the interaction between the two is 






Figure 4. The Relation between Mind Wandering and Concentration for Subjects with 
High and Low WMC in Experiment 1. The lines represent the means of the within-person 
slopes for subjects in the top quartile of WMC (thicker line) and the bottom quartile of 
WMC (thinner line). Mind wandering is on the y-axis, where 0 = on-task and 1 = off-
task. Concentration is group-centered on the x-axis, where negative values indicate less 
concentration and positive values indicate more concentration. 
 
Secondary Analyses 
Although I was primarily interested in how TUTs related to post-incubation 
insight and creativity, I also ran similar models distinguishing tune outs from zone outs as 
predictors, to test the assertion that tuning out would be beneficial for insight and 
creativity, but zoning out would not. Instead, I found that neither tuning out nor zoning 
out predicted post-incubation performance on insight or creativity tasks. Post-incubation 
coins solvers did not tune out more (M = .20, SD = 0.18) than those who never solved (M 




zoning out, post-incubation coins solvers did not differ (M = .15, SD = 0.10) from those 
who never solved (M = .14, SD = 0.15), t(109) = -.16, p = .88, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.11], d = -
0.07. Likewise, post-incubation pigpen solvers did not tune out more (M = .18, SD = 
0.20) than those who never solved (M = .26, SD = 0.21), t(108) = 1.31, p = .19, 95% CI [-
0.04, 0.20], d = 0.38. And again, post-incubation pigpen solvers did not differ in zoning 
out (M = .12, SD = 0.18) from those who never solved (M = .16, SD = 0.16), t(108) = 
0.93, p = .36, 95% [-0.05, 0.14], d = 0.26. In addition, regardless of what type of scoring 
was used, post-incubation divergent thinking was not related to tune outs (average r(114) 
= .01, p = .95; top-two r(114) = -.03, p = .75; max-two r(114) = .00, p = .97) or zone outs 
(average r(114) = -.11, p = .24; top-two r(114) = -.10, p = .27; max-two r(114) = .02, p = 
.86).  
Pre-incubation solvers for the coins and pigpen problems were excluded in the 
primary analyses, but will be reported here for completeness. Subjects who solved the 
coins task before the incubation period did not differ in WMC z-scores (M = -.17, SD = 
0.77) from those who never solved (M z-score = .02, SD = 0.77), t(111) = .72, p = .47, 
95% CI [-0.34, 0.72], d = 0.25, or those who solved after the incubation period (M z-
score = -.06, SD = 1.09), t(14) = .25, p = .81, 95% CI [-0.88, 1.11], d = 0.12. Likewise, in 
the pigpen problem, subjects who solved the task before the incubation period did not 
differ in WMC z-scores (M = .27, SD = 0.65) from those who never solved (M z-score = -
.11, SD = 0.76), t(103) = -1.45, p = .15, 95% CI [-0.90, 0.14], d = -0.53, or those who 
solved post-incubation (M z-score = .60, SD = 0.77), t(21) = 1.07, p = .30, 95% CI [-0.31, 




Regarding TUT rates, subjects who solved the coins task pre-incubation (M TUT 
rate = .44, SD = 0.32) did not differ from those who never solved (M TUT rate = .41, SD 
= 0.26), t(111) = -.33, p = .74, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.15], d = -0.10, or those who solved post-
incubation (M TUT rate = .35, SD = 0.16), t(12.28) = -.73, p = .48, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.18], 
d = -0.35; note that for the latter analysis, the Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances 
was significant, so I used a t-test that does not assume equal variances across groups. 
Likewise, subjects who solved the pigpen task pre-incubation did not differ in TUT rates 
(M TUT rate = .32, SD = 0.25) from those who never solved (M TUT rate = .42, SD = 
0.24), t(103) = 1.22, p = .23, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.27], d = 0.42, or those who solved post-
incubation (M TUT rate = .30, SD = 0.29), t(21) = -.16, p = .88, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.23], d = 
-0.07.  
Pre-incubation creativity scores, which were also omitted in the primary analyses, 
did not correlate with WMC z-scores (average scoring: r(117) = .14, p = .14; top-two 
scoring: r(117) = .13, p = .18; max-two scoring: r(117) = .04, p = .66) or with TUT rates 
during the creativity incubation tasks (average scoring: r(117) = -.04, p = .65; top-two 
scoring: r(117) = -.10, p = .29; max-two scoring: r(117) = -.02, p = .85).  
Although the two analytical problems—crime and Ravens—were used primarily 
as distractors in this experiment, I report their analyses for completeness. During the 
crime problem, 17 people (14.4%) solved the problem while 101 people (85.6%) did not. 
Likewise, 26 people (22.0%) solved the Ravens problem while 92 (78%) did not. 
Subjects who solved the Ravens problem had a significantly higher WMC z-score (M = 




95% CI [-0.73, -0.06], d = -0.54. For the crime problem, however, there was no 
difference in WMC z-scores between solvers (M = .17, SD = 0.89) and non-solvers (M = 
-.01, SD = 0.76), t(116) = -0.89, p = .38, 95% CI [-0.58, 0.22], d = -0.22. 
Discussion 
 The main hypotheses that Experiment 1 was designed to test, from an individual 
differences perspective, were as follows: (1) is executive control helpful for insight and 
creativity? (2) is lack of executive control helpful for insight and creativity? (3) does the 
correlation between WMC and TUTs vary by context? (4) does concentration moderate 
the relationship between WMC and TUTs?  
In Experiment 1, I found that WMC did not predict post-incubation creativity (as 
indicated by divergent thinking performance) or post-incubation coins solving, but people 
who solved the pigpen problem after incubation did have significantly greater WMC than 
those who never solved. Also, from an individual-differences perspective, mind 
wandering during an incubation period was not beneficial to either post-incubation 
insight problem solving or creativity. In addition, the correlation between WMC and TUT 
rates did not change across tasks, regardless of whether or not subjects were given an 
experimentally-induced reason to mind wander. Finally, concentration did not moderate 
the relationship between WMC and TUTs.  
 The inconsistency in how WMC predicted post-incubation solving in the coins vs. 
pigpen problem could have been due to the drastic difference in solving rates between the 
two insight problems. In the pigpen problem, there were 14 post-incubation solvers, but 




floor, the coins problem may not have had enough “successful” data points, resulting in 
an under-powered analysis. Therefore, in Experiment 2, I presented the coins problem 
using actual coins with the intention that this would increase solving rates. Instead of 
asking the subjects to draw out the solution, I presented them with large plastic coins 
arranged in the initial pattern (Figure 1A), and asked them to move two of the coins to 
achieve the correct answer. Based on work by Ormerod, MacGregor, and Chronicle 
(2002), who gave their subjects wooden coins to manipulate, I suspected that it would be 
less of a “leap” to reach the correct solution with three dimensional coins vs. drawing 
them in a two dimensional format, increasing the number of solvers.  
 The finding that WMC did not predict post-incubation creativity was somewhat 
surprising—WMC consistently predicts success in many higher-order cognitive tasks, 
and is closely related to Gf, which moderately predicts success in creativity tasks. It is 
possible, however, that because WMC and Gf are not one in the same, the variance in Gf 
that is not shared with WMC could be responsible for the correlation between creativity 
and Gf. Alternatively, other research has suggested that WMC may in fact be harmful to 
creativity, and so it will be important to replicate my findings in Experiment 2 before 
drawing any conclusions.  
 From an individual-differences approach, mind wandering during an incubation 
period was not beneficial to either insight problem solving or creativity (and was actually 
trending towards harmful in the pigpen task), which contradicts my hypothesis and 
indirectly conflicts with some past research. It is possible, however, that this null effect 




n-back task, not only because it has been used successfully as an incubation task before 
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), but also because people have reported a significant amount 
of mind wandering during this task (~50% TUT rates; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 
2013), and so I expected that it would similarly allow for mind wandering in the 
incubation task. Although the subjects here, once again, reported that they were mind 
wandering during a substantial number of thought probes (~40%), a meta-analysis of the 
incubation literature, suggests that an incubation task that requires a low cognitive load is 
the most beneficial for performance in insight tasks (Sio & Ormerod, 2009).  Specifically, 
previous work that has successfully found an incubation effect has often used science 
fiction readings as an incubation task (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1991). So, in order to 
give mind wandering its best opportunity to show a benefit to creativity, I based my 
incubation task for Experiment 2 on several science fiction readings. 
 I also tested the separate effects of tuning out and zoning out on insight and 
creativity. Contrary to previous work, which has suggested that tuning out would be 
beneficial for insight and creativity whereas zoning out would not, I found that neither 
tuning out nor zoning out predicted post-incubation performance on insight or creativity 
tasks. It will be important to replicate these results before drawing any further 
conclusions, however, at this point it seems as though mind wandering is not beneficial to 
insight and creativity, regardless of whether people are aware (e.g., tuning out) or not 
(e.g., zoning out).  
 Based on the idea that mind wandering during an incubation period may provide a 




vary by context. That is, when there was no experimentally-induced reason to mind 
wander (i.e., during the stand-alone SART), TUTs should be lower for people with high 
WMC than for people with low WMC (resulting in a negative correlation), but when 
there was an experimentally-induced reason to mind wander (i.e., during the n-back 
incubation task) TUTs might be greater for people with high WMC than for people with 
low WMC (resulting in a positive correlation). Instead, I found that there was no 
significant difference between the correlations in the two different contexts and was 
actually trending in the opposite direction of what I had predicted. This could be because 
the stand-alone SART was the first task in the first session, when the association between 
WMC and TUTs is potentially weaker (McVay & Kane, 2009), but it could also be a 
result of using two different tasks for the two different contexts (i.e., the stand-alone task 
was always the SART and the incubation task was always the n-back). For this reason, 
and to confirm that this is not simply a power issue, it will be important to replicate this 
trend in Experiment 2.   
 Previous research into daily life has suggested that, without taking concentration 
into consideration, mind wandering research in the lab may be underestimating the 
relationship between WMC and TUTs (Kane et al., 2007). Although I did find that 
concentration predicted mind wandering, it did not moderate the relationship between 
WMC and mind wandering in Experiment 1. Once again, before drawing any 








 The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with two notable 
exceptions. First, the SART and n-back tasks were replaced with word-by-word prose-
reading tasks to measure stand-alone and incubation mind-wandering rates, described 
below. Second, two personality measures—the openness subscale of the NEO-PI-3 
(McCrae & Costa, 2010) and the need for cognition questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984)—were added to the end of the second session (replacing the Ravens 
problem). Because the intention behind having the analytical problems included in the 
sessions was to prevent subjects from noticing a pattern of how to solve the insight 
problems, it seemed safe to eliminate the Raven’s problem since it was the last task in the 
last session, and would not affect the previously presented insight problems. The 
openness subscale of the NEO questionnaire was used to measure openness to 
experience. Most relevant to present purposes, people who score high on openness to 
experience tend to be intellectually curious and have an increased motivation to be 
creative (McCrae, 1987). Likewise, I used the need for cognition questionnaire to 
estimate how often people choose to engage in critical thinking and how much they enjoy 
it when they do (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, I used these two measures as 
indicators of intrinsic motivation and valuing the goal of the task—two factors that could 




the need for cognition score as moderators in separate analyses, I tested whether the 
impact of WMC on creativity, insight, or both, would be stronger for subjects who were 
also high on openness to experience or in need for cognition. 
Methods 
Subjects 
In order to keep my N similar across experiments, while accounting for subjects 
who would need to be dropped, I aimed to collect data from about 130 people in both 
sessions of Experiment 2. Once again, undergraduates enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses at UNCG earned partial credit toward a course requirement for their 
participation in each of two two-hour sessions. One hundred and fifty-four 
undergraduates, who had not participated in Experiment 1, completed the first session of 
Experiment 2; of those, 131 students returned to complete the second session as well. In 
order to minimize attrition, we gave the majority of the credits upon the completion of the 
second session.  
Reading Tasks  
For each incubation task and the stand-alone task for TUT assessment, subjects 
read a different science fiction story, presented one word at a time on-screen, and 
responded by pressing the space bar whenever they detected an anomaly: On 5% of the 
word trials, two adjacent words were swapped (e.g., Bill played fetch his with dog), 
representing an anomaly target. Subjects were asked to respond only after they had seen 
the second swapped word (e.g., after with in my example). Nearly identical to the 




followed by a blank screen for 600 ms. This rate was based on Smallwood, McSpadden, 
and Schooler’s (2008) reported average reading time of 304 ms per word in a word-by-
word reading comprehension study. Presenting words at a constant pace helped to control 
for differences in self-paced reading speed and ensured that all subjects had the same 
incubation time. During this 20 min task, subjects saw approximately 1200 words, 61 of 
which were targets; thought probes appeared immediately after approximately 60% of the 
targets. These 35 thought probes are identical in format to, and comparable in number to, 
the probes used in the Experiment 1 SART (60 probes) and n-back tasks (21 probes). 
After each story, subjects answered five multiple-choice questions about the story, via 
mouse click, to motivate their reading for comprehension.  
Non-Cognitive Assessments 
 We used two personality inventories—openness and need for cognition—to 
measure intellectual and creative motivation, but I combined them into one computer-
presented questionnaire. Questions from the need for cognition measure were dispersed 
evenly throughout the openness questions, using a repeating pattern of two openness 
items, followed by one need for cognition item, followed by three openness items, 
followed by one need for cognition item, followed by three openness items, followed by 
one more need for cognition item before looping back to the beginning of the sequence 
with two openness items, etc. until all 66 items were included. Both questionnaires asked 
subjects to respond using a five-option Likert-type scale, ranging from “Strongly Agree” 





 Openness. This questionnaire, which was taken from the NEO-PI-3 (McCrae & 
Costa, 2010), is made up of six facets—fantasy (e.g., I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy 
or daydream and exploring all its possibilities, letting it grow and develop), aesthetics 
(e.g., I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature), feelings (e.g., I experience a 
wide range of emotions or feelings), actions (e.g., I think it’s interesting to learn and 
develop new hobbies), ideas (e.g., I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas), 
and values (e.g., I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people’s 
lifestyles)—with eight questions defining each and half reverse-coded. Although I was 
primarily interested in the general openness construct, of secondary interest to me was the 
fantasy facet, which, at face value, appears to measure propensity to mind wander.  
 Need for cognition. I used the short form of the need for cognition questionnaire 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao; 1984), which consists of 18 questions (nine of which are 
reverse-coded). Although the original questionnaire used a -4 to +4 Likert-type scale, I 
used a -2 to +2 scale in order to keep the responses consistent with the openness measure 
in the combined questionnaire (i.e., Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and 
Strongly Agree).  
Results 
Subjects 
Data from subjects were omitted for processing-portion errors on either span task 
(14 people) and for one person who was older than my target, young adult, age group of 
18-30. Using the same criterion as in Experiment 1, outliers were determined by 




but here, nobody had an accuracy of 75% or less and so data from all remaining subjects 
were retained (mean accuracy and reaction times can be found in Appendix C). A total of 
116 people were included for analyses, ranging in age from 18-28 years (M = 18.88, 
66.4% female). By self-report, the final sample’s racial composition was 56.0% White, 
31.0% Black, 3.4% Asian, 5.2% Multiracial, 1.7% Native American or Alaskan Native, 
and 2.6% Other. Additionally, regarding self-reported ethnicity, 4.3% self-identified as 
Latino/Hispanic.  
Primary Analyses 
 Descriptive statistics for WMC and TUT measures can be found in Table 7, and 
descriptive statistics for the non-cognitive measures can be found in Table 8. The 
respective correlation matrices for these measures can be found in Tables 9 and 10. As in 
Experiment 1, I collapsed across the two WMC tasks (operation span and symmetry 
span) to create one WMC z-score composite measure. Average WMC z-scores were 
lower in Experiment 2 (M = -0.2076, SD = 0.84), compared to Experiment 1 (M = -
0.0005, SD = 0.78), t(234) = 1.960, p = .051, 95% CI [0.00, 0.42], d = 0.25. Across all 
reading tasks, subjects were mind wandering approximately 30% of the time, regardless 
of whether the task was stand-alone or as an incubation period. Just as in Experiment 1, a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated no statistical differences in average 
TUT rates across any of the five different tasks, F(4, 573) = 1.165, p = .325, MSE = 
0.058, ηp2 = .008). Furthermore, TUT rates correlated significantly across all across all 
pairwise tasks, rs = .40 to .72 (see Table 9), indicating that mind wandering is also 




1, and this remained true whether I took the average TUT rate across all five tasks, t(230) 
= 4.582, p < .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16], d = 0.60, or compared the tasks one-by-one 
(stand-alone: t(233) = 4.175, p < .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16], d = 0.54; coins: t(233) = 
4.647, p < .001, 95% CI [0.09, 0.21], d = 0.61; pigpen: t(232) = 3.677, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.06, 0.19], d = 0.48; brick: t(234) = 3.220, p = .001, 95% CI [0.04, 0.16], d = 0.42; or 




Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind 
Wandering  
 
 N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Sspan Z 116 -0.325 1.040 -2.615 1.959 -0.245 -0.682 
Ospan Z 116 -0.091 1.022 -3.145 1.546 -0.832  0.452 
WMC Z 116 -0.208 0.841 -2.783 1.585 -0.519  0.069 
Stand-alone TO 116  0.127 0.117  0 0.571  1.081  1.065 
Stand-alone ZO 116  0.128 0.146  0 0.722  1.462  2.197 
Stand-alone TUT 116  0.256 0.212  0 0.861  0.951  0.239 
Coins TO 115  0.139 0.146  0 0.657  1.451  2.234 
Coins ZO 115  0.126 0.162  0 0.943  2.050  5.612 
Coins TUT 115  0.265 0.227  0 1  0.962  0.481 
PigPen TO 115  0.146 0.173  0 0.943  2.135  5.464 
PigPen ZO 115  0.132 0.168  0 0.944  2.262  6.698 
PigPen TUT 115  0.278 0.251  0 0.944  1.141  0.438 
Brick TO 116  0.151 0.183  0 0.914  2.108  5.075 
Brick ZO 116  0.145 0.167  0 0.857  1.742  3.607 
Brick TUT 116  0.296 0.245  0 1  0.943  0.190 
Knife TO 116  0.137 0.148  0 0.829  1.670  3.733 
Knife ZO 116  0.178 0.199  0 0.943  1.433  1.912 
Knife TUT 116  0.315 0.262  0 1  0.733 -0.250 
Note. Z = Z scores based on database of over 3000 people; WMC = working memory 







Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics for Non-Cognitive Variables 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Fantasy Facet 116 0.610 1.106 -1.543 3.022 -0.037 -0.714 
Aesthetics Facet 116 0.747 0.996 -2.000 2.561 -0.300 -0.421 
Feelings Facet 116 0.609 1.065 -2.049 2.829 -0.479  0.198 
Actions Facet 116 0.485 1.179 -2.194 3.917  0.386  0.117 
Ideas Facet 116 0.438 0.847 -1.259 2.630  0.274  0.078 
Values Facet 116 0.358 1.077 -2.643 2.833 -0.090 -0.017 
Openness 116 0.816 1.047 -2.242 3.134 -0.011  0.121 
Need for Cognition 116 0.000 1.000 -2.688 2.852  0.138 -0.065 
Note. All measures are z-scores; openness measures are based on normed means and 







Experiment 2 Correlations Among Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind Wandering 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Sspan Z 1.00          
2. Ospan Z  .33** 1.00         
3. WMC Z  .82**  .81** 1.00        
4. Stand-alone TOs -.03 -.01 -.03 1.00       
5. Stand-alone ZOs  .00  .28**  .17  .30** 1.00      
6. Stand-alone TUTs -.02  .19*  .10  .76**  .85** 1.00     
7. Coins TOs -.02 -.05 -.04  .40**  .07  .27** 1.00    
8. Coins ZOs -.06 -.02 -.05  .33**  .48**  .51**  .09 1.00   
9. Coins TUTs -.05 -.04 -.06  .49**  .39**  .53**  .70**  .77** 1.00  
10. Pigpen TOs  .00  .10  .06  .35**  .10  .27**  .58**  .17  .50** 1.00 
11. Pigpen ZOs  .01  .18  .12  .26**  .60**  .56**  .12  .51**  .44**  .08 
12. Pigpen TUTs  .01  .19*  .12  .42**  .48**  .56**  .48**  .46**  .64**  .75** 
13. Brick TOs  .06  .05  .07  .33**  .06  .22*  .71**  .09  .52**  .62** 
14. Brick ZOs -.02  .06  .03  .32**  .59**  .58** -.01  .67**  .47**  .09 
15. Brick TUTs  .04  .08  .07  .47**  .44**  .56**  .52**  .52**  .71**  .53** 
16. Knife TOs  .01  .04  .03  .42**  .11  .31**  .43**  .21*  .43**  .65** 
17. Knife ZOs  .02  .15  .10  .27**  .60**  .56**  .04  .41**  .32**  .09 
18. Knife TUTs  .02  .13  .09  .44**  .52**  .60**  .27**  .43**  .48**  .44** 
19. Incubation TOs  .01  .05  .04  .46**  .10  .32**  .83**  .16  .65**  .88** 
20. Incubation ZOs -.01  .13  .07  .38**  .72**  .70**  .06  .81**  .62**  .14 





Table 9 (continued) 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Sspan Z           
2. Ospan Z           
3. WMC Z           
4. Stand-alone TOs           
5. Stand-alone ZOs           
6. Stand-alone TUTs           
7. Coins TOs           
8. Coins ZOs           
9. Coins TUTs           
10. Pigpen TOs           
11. Pigpen ZOs 1.00          
12. Pigpen TUTs  .73** 1.00         
13. Brick TOs  .14  .52** 1.00        
14. Brick ZOs  .33**  .29** -.02 1.00       
15. Brick TUTs  .33**  .59**  .73**  .67** 1.00      
16. Knife TOs  .20*  .58**  .36**  .17  .39** 1.00     
17. Knife ZOs  .68**  .52**  .05  .30**  .24**  .13 1.00    
18. Knife TUTs  .63**  .72**  .24**  .33**  .40**  .66**  .83** 1.00   
19. Incubation TOs  .16  .71**  .84**  .06  .67**  .74**  .09  .48** 1.00  
20. Incubation ZOs  .81**  .64**  .08  .72**  .54**  .23*  .79**  .73**  .15 1.00 
21. Incubation TUTs  .65**  .89**  .60**  .52**  .80**  .63**  .58**  .80**  .75**  .76** 
Note. Z = Z scores based on database of over 3000 people; WMC = working memory capacity; TO = tune outs; ZO = zone 
outs; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts 























Openness Need for 
Cognition 
1. Sspan Z      .06      .07     -.14     -.24**      .02     -.05     -.06     -.17 
2. Ospan Z     -.05     -.14     -.14     -.25**     -.18     -.15     -.22*     -.16 
3. WMC Z      .01     -.05     -.17     -.30**     -.10     -.12     -.16     -.20* 
4. Stand-alone TUTs      .14     -.03      .03     -.04     -.04      .04      .02     -.01 
5. Coins TUTs      .13      .10      .07      .19*     -.03      .01      .12     -.01 
6. Pigpen TUTs      .03      .07     -.05      .12     -.12      .03      .02     -.09 
7. Brick TUTs     -.01      .01      .05     -.05     -.20*     -.08     -.07     -.12 
8. Knife TUTs      .15      .13     -.01      .15     -.10      .17      .13     -.13 
9. Incubation TUTs      .08      .08      .00      .12     -.13      .04      .05     -.12 
10. Average Pre Inc DT      .28**      .22*      .18      .28**      .06      .20*      .30**      .02 
11. Average Post Inc DT      .25*      .13      .17      .21*      .08      .21*      .26**      .00 
12. Top-Two Pre Inc DT      .18      .10      .15      .14     -.04      .05      .14     -.03 
13. Top-Two Post Inc DT      .18      .01      .17      .25**      .08      .14      .19*      .00 
14. Max-Two Pre Inc DT      .24*      .16      .17      .20*     -.01      .03      .20*      .02 
15. Max-Two Post Inc DT      .20*     -.03      .09      .15      .04      .06      .12      .00 
Note. Z = Z scores based on database of over 3000 people; WMC = working memory capacity; TO = tune outs; ZO = zone 
outs; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; DT = divergent thinking. 





 Changing the coins insight problem to a three-dimensional, manipulable format 
increased the number of solvers, as expected, yielding 15 pre-incubation solvers (12.9%), 
22 post-incubation solvers (19.0%), and 79 people who never solved the coins problem 
(68.1%). Unfortunately, in the pigpen problem, rates of solution dropped substantially 
from Experiment 1, despite its identical presentation: There were 9 pre-incubation solvers 
(7.8%), 7 post-incubation solvers (6.0%), and 99 who never solved (85.3%). In addition, 
there was one person who had seen the pigpen problem before, and was therefore 
excluded for any pigpen analyses (0.9%). Once again, people who solved either insight 
problem pre-incubation were excluded from the relevant, primary analyses. 
 As stated before, inter-rater reliability across the two experiments was quite good 
for both brick and knife (see Table 1). Also, overall creativity (collapsed across pre- and 
post-incubation) in the brick task was correlated with overall creativity in the knife task, 
regardless of using average, r(111) = .55, p < .001, top-two, r(112) = .40, p < .001, or 
max-two scoring, r(112) = .50, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, brick and knife scores were 
averaged together to create one creativity measure. 
 Is executive control helpful for insight and creativity? Similar to the results from 
Experiment 1, subjects who solved the coins problem after incubation did not have a 
significantly different WMC z-score than did those who never solved the coins problem 
(M = -.28 [SD = 0.89] & -.25 [SD = 0.85], respectively), t(99) = 0.15, p = .88, 95% CI [-
0.38, 0.44], d = 0.04. For the pigpen problem, I replicated the Experiment 1 pattern, 
finding that WMC z-scores were higher for post-incubation pigpen solvers (M = .23, SD 




not significant here, t(104) = -1.44, p = .15, 95% CI [-1.15, 0.18], d = -0.65. In addition, 
WMC was, again, not a significant predictor of post-incubation creativity (average r(107) 




Figure 5. Experiment 2 Correlation Scatter between WMC and Creativity (Average 
Scoring).  
 
 Is lack of executive control helpful for insight and creativity? Similar to the 
results from Experiment 1, subjects who solved the coins problem after incubation did 




coins problem (M TUT rates = .25 [SD = 0.28] and .28 [SD = 0.22], respectively), t(99) = 
0.55, p = .59, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.14], d = 0.12. And, if anything, subjects who solved the 
pigpen problem after incubation mind wandered less (M TUT rate = .14, SD = 0.13) than 
those who never solved (M TUT rate = .29, SD = 0.26), but not significantly so, t(104) = 
1.49, p = .14, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.35], d = 0.72. 
Just as I found in Experiment 1, mind wandering during the incubation task was 
not beneficial for post-incubation creativity scores, regardless of using an average, r(107) 
= .04, p = .67, top-two, r(107) = -.07, p = .47, or max-two scoring method, r(107) = .02, p 





Figure 6. Experiment 2 Correlation Scatter between TUT Rates and Creativity (Average 
Scoring). 
 
Once again, I tested whether the interaction between WMC and TUT rates could 
predict insight or creativity, with the possibility that people high in WMC and TUT rates 
may be more insightful or creative. Logistic regressions testing whether this interaction 
predicted insight can be found in Table 11.  Unlike Experiment 1 (where post-incubation 
pigpen solvers were high in WMC and low in TUT rates), I found no significant 
interaction for either coins or pigpen problems. For the creativity outcome, a regression 




Table 11  
 
Experiment 2 WMC x TUT Logistic Regression on Insight Problem Solving 
 
      95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 B SE Wald p Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Coins Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score -0.045 0.239   0.036 .850 0.956 0.598 1.527 
   Coins TUT Rate -0.139 0.249   0.312 .576 0.870 0.534 1.418 
   Constant -1.281 0.242 27.928 .000 0.278   
Block 2        
   WMC x TUT  0.174 0.229   0.577 .447 1.190 0.760 1.865 
Pigpen Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.725 0.478   2.301 .129 2.064 0.809 5.265 
   Pigpen TUT Rate -0.949 0.639   2.202 .138 0.387 0.111 1.356 
   Constant -3.098 0.569 29.673 .000 0.045   
Block 2        
   WMC x TUT  0.036 0.812   0.002 .964 1.037 0.211 5.090 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; Coins N = 101, 




Experiment 2 WMC x TUT Hierarchical Linear Regression on Creativity 
 
      95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (Δ R2 = .003)        
   WMC z-score  0.014 0.033  0.040   0.413 .680 -0.052 0.079 
   Creativity TUT Rate  0.012 0.033  0.037   0.380 .705 -0.053 0.078 
   Constant  2.032 0.033  61.663 .000  1.967 2.097 
Block 2 (Δ R2 = .007)        
   WMC x TUT -0.029 0.034 -0.084  -0.853 .396 -0.097 0.039 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; N = 109; all 






Cross-experimental analyses of pigpen solving and divergent thinking. Because 
my results regarding the pigpen problem in Experiment 2 were somewhat inconsistent (in 
terms of statistical significance) with those from Experiment 1, I collapsed the data sets 
across my two experiments to increase power, and re-ran the analyses. Here, post-
incubation solvers’ WMC scores (M = 0.48, SD = 0.72, N = 21) were significantly 
higher, t(214) = -3.54, p <.001, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.29], d = -0.86, than were non-solvers’ 
(M = -0.18, SD = 0.82, N = 195). Also, post-incubation pigpen solvers tended to mind 
wander less (M TUT rate = .25, SD = 0.25) than did people who never solved (M TUT 
rate = .36, SD = 0.26), but not significantly so, t(214) = 1.82, p = .07, 95% CI [-0.01, 
0.23], d = 0.42. Finally, I ran a logistic regression to test whether the interaction between 
WMC and TUT rates predicted solving in the pigpen insight problem. WMC and pigpen 
TUT rates were entered into the regression at Step 1 and the interaction between the two 
(WMC x TUT) was entered at Step 2. The interaction did predict pigpen solving in the 





Table 13  
 
Cross-Experimental WMC x TUT Logistic Regression on Pigpen Insight Problem 
Solving 
 
      95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 B SE Wald p Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Pigpen Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.986 0.301 10.740 .001 2.681 1.486 4.834 
   Pigpen TUT Rate -0.483 0.277   3.034 .082 0.617 0.359 1.062 
   Constant -2.637 0.318 68.800 .000 0.072   
Block 2        
   WMC x TUT -0.538 0.310   3.007 .083 0.584 0.318 1.073 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thought; N = 216; 
Pigpen TUT Rates were centered and WMC z-scores were re-centered after combining 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
 We were also able to run cross-experimental analyses on creativity because the 
tasks did not change across experiments. To no surprise, when collapsing the data from 
the divergent thinking tasks across experiments, I replicated the results found in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Regardless of whether average, top-two, or max-two scoring was 
used, neither WMC (r(223) = .03, p = .64; r(223) = .03, p = .71; r(223) = .02, p = .72, 
respectively) nor TUT rates during divergent-thinking incubation (r(223) = -.01, p = .90; 
r(223) = -.08, p = .25; r(223) = .02, p = .77, respectively) predicted post-incubation 
creativity. In addition, using a hierarchical multiple regression with WMC and creativity 
TUT rates entered at Step 1 and an interaction of WMC x TUT entered at Step 2, nothing 









Cross-Experimental WMC x TUT Hierarchical Linear Regression on Creativity 
 
      95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (Δ R2 = .001)        
   WMC z-score  0.010 0.022  0.032   0.471 .638 -0.032 0.053 
   Creativity TUT Rate -0.003 0.022 -0.010  -0.144 .885 -0.046 0.039 
   Constant  2.038 0.022  94.246 .000  1.995 2.081 
Block 2 (Δ R2 = .000)        
   WMC x TUT -0.004 0.022 -0.013  -0.187 .852 -0.048 0.040 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thought; N = 225; 
Creativity TUT Rates were centered and WMC z-scores were re-centered after 
combining Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
 Does the correlation between WMC and TUTs vary by context? Once again, I 
tested whether or not the correlation between WMC and TUT rate varied as a function of 
task type (i.e., stand-alone vs. incubation). Comparing the correlation between WMC and 
TUT rate during the stand-alone task (r = .10) to the correlation between WMC and TUT 
rate during the incubation tasks (r = .07), I found that there was no statistically significant 
difference in magnitude between the two, t(112) = 0.41, p = .68.  
 Does concentration moderate the relationship between WMC and TUTs? Using 
the same multilevel model as in Experiment 1, and collapsing across all of the reading 
tasks, I included a fixed effect for concentration at Level 1 and fixed effects for WMC on 
the intercept and on the concentration slope at Level 2 to predict TUTs (0 = on task, 1 = 
off task) on any given trial. Also like Experiment 1, I added a random effect for the 
intercept. Once again, I found that concentration negatively predicted TUTs (β10 = -1.10, 




(β01 = -0.02, t(114) = -0.09, p = .93), and concentration did not moderate the association 
between WMC and TUTs (β11 = -0.11, t(17383) = -1.22, p = .23; see Figure 7). Finally, a 
significant person-level random effect on the intercept suggests that there remain 




Experiment 2 WMC x Concentration Hierarchical Linear Model on Mind Wandering 
 
Fixed Effect Coefficient SE T-ratio d.f. p 
Intercept, β00 -0.988 0.171   -5.767 114 .000 
   WMC, β01 -0.018 0.204   -0.090 114 .929 
Concentration, β10 -1.097 0.062 -17.666 17383 .000 
   WMC, β11 -0.112 0.092   -1.215 17383 .225 
      
Random Effect χ2 SD Variance 
Component 
d.f. p 
Intercept, r0 4161.386 1.807 3.264 114 .000 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; calculated by averaging across operation span 
and symmetry span z-scores. In this analysis, the main effects of WMC and concentration 
are represented by β01 and β10, respectively, and the interaction between the two is 







Figure 7. The Relation between Mind Wandering and Concentration for Subjects with 
High and Low WMC in Experiment 2. The lines represent the means of the within-person 
slopes for subjects in the top quartile of WMC (thicker line) and the bottom quartile of 
WMC (thinner line). Mind wandering is on the y-axis, where 0 = on-task and 1 = off-
task. Concentration is group-centered on the x-axis, where negative values indicate less 
concentration and positive values indicate more concentration. 
 
  Does intellectual motivation moderate the relationship between WMC and insight 
or creativity? Before testing my hypothesis, I first looked at how these measures relate to 
one another. The openness subscale of the NEO was positively correlated with the need 
for cognition questionnaire, r(114) = .42, p < .001, but trended negatively with WMC, 
r(114) = -.16, p = .08. In addition, need for cognition was significantly and negatively 
correlated with WMC, r(114) = -.20, p = .03. Regarding creativity, openness was 
significantly correlated with the average score of post-incubation creativity, r(107) = .26, 




score, r(107) = .12, p = .22. The need for cognition questionnaire, on the other hand, did 
not correlate significantly with any measure of post-incubation creativity (average r(107) 
= .00, p = 1.00; top-two r(107) = .00, p = 1.00; max-two r(102) = .00, p = .99; see Figure 
9). Contrary to predictions, scores on the openness subscale were not predictive of post-
incubation solving in the coins task (M z-score for solvers = 1.07, SD = 0.99; M z-score 
for non-solvers = .81, SD = 1.04), t(99) = -1.07, p = .29, 95% CI [-0.76, 0.23], d = -0.26, 
or the pigpen task (M z-score for solvers = .47, SD = 1.60; M z-score for non-solvers = 
.82, SD = 1.01), t(6.346) = .57, p = .59, 95% CI [-1.13, 1.83], d = 0.26; note that equal 
variances were not assumed. need for cognition scores were not predictive of post-
incubation solving in the pigpen task (M z-score for solvers = .49, SD = 1.27; M z-score 
for non-solvers = -.01, SD = 0.98), t(104) = -1.30, p = .20, 95% CI [-1.28, 0.27], d = -
0.45, but they were indicative of post-incubation coins solving (M z-score for solvers = 
.39, SD = 0.99; M z-score for non-solvers = -.10, SD = 0.99), t(99) = -2.04, p = .04, 95% 

















 To test my hypothesis that openness and need for cognition might interact with 
WMC to predict insight and creativity, I ran several regressions (see Tables 16–19). In 
my first hierarchical linear regression, I entered WMC z-score and openness in Block 1 to 
predict average post-incubation creativity, and added in the WMC x openness interaction 
at Block 2 (Table 16). Likewise, in my second hierarchical linear regression, I entered 
WMC z-score and need for cognition in Block 1 and added the WMC x need for 




nor need for cognition moderated the relationship between WMC and average post-
incubation creativity. In order to test the influence of these same interactions on insight 
problem solving, I ran separate logistic regressions for coins and pigpen (see Tables 18–
19). Similar to the regressions for creativity, WMC z-scores and the personality measure 
(either openness or need for cognition) were entered at Block 1 and the interaction 
between the two was entered at Block 2. Once again, the interaction between WMC and 
openness did not predict post-incubation solving in either coins or pigpen problem 
solving, and neither did the interaction between WMC and need for cognition.  
 
Table 16  
 
Experiment 2 WMC x Openness Hierarchical Linear Regression on Creativity 
 
      95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (Δ R2 = .072)        
   WMC z-score 0.029 0.032 0.087   0.916 .362 -0.034 0.093 
   Openness 0.091 0.032 0.268   2.832 .006  0.027 0.155 
   Constant 2.032 0.032  63.907 .000  1.969 2.095 
Block 2 (Δ R2 = .000)        
   WMC x Openness 0.002 0.031 0.008   0.077 .939 -0.058 0.063 






Table 17  
 
Experiment 2 WMC x Need for Cognition Hierarchical Linear Regression on Creativity 
 
      95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (Δ R2 = .002)        
   WMC z-score  0.015 0.033  0.046   0.461 .645 -0.051 0.082 
   Need for Cognition  0.003 0.034  0.008   0.085 .933 -0.064 0.069 
   Constant  2.032 0.033  61.617 .000  1.967 2.097 
Block 2 (Δ R2 = .006)        
   WMC x Need for Cog -0.026 0.031 -0.083 -0.826 .411 -0.087 0.036 





Experiment 2 WMC x Openness Logistic Regression on Insight Problem Solving 
 
      95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 B SE Wald p Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Coins Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.000 0.236   0.000 1.000 1.000 0.630 1.588 
   Openness  0.268 0.253   1.118  .290 1.307 0.795 2.149 
   Constant -1.310 0.247 28.075  .000 0.270   
Block 2        
   WMC x Openness  0.270 0.249   1.175  .278 1.310 0.804 2.135 
Pigpen Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.634 0.466   1.848  .174 1.885 0.756 4.704 
   Openness -0.290 0.413   0.492  .483 0.749 0.333 1.681 
   Constant -2.862 0.473 36.611  .000 0.057   
Block 2        
   WMC x Openness -0.067 0.433   0.024  .877 0.935 0.401 2.184 
Note. WMC =  working memory capacity; Coins N = 101, Pigpen N = 106; all predictors 







Experiment 2 WMC x Need for Cognition Logistic Regression on Insight Problem 
Solving 
 
      95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 B SE Wald p Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Coins Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.075 0.244   0.095 .758 1.078 0.668 1.741 
   Need for Cog  0.519 0.260   3.973 .046 1.681 1.009 2.800 
   Constant -1.348 0.256 27.769 .000 0.260   
Block 2        
   WMC x Need for Cog  0.152 0.240   0.403 .526 1.165 0.727 1.865 
Pigpen Predictors        
Block 1        
   WMC z-score  0.754 0.455   2.744 .098 2.126 0.871 5.188 
   Need for Cog  0.662 0.422   2.459 .117 1.938 0.848 4.430 
   Constant -2.990 0.508 34.597 .000 0.050   
Block 2        
   WMC x Need for Cog  0.061 0.448   0.019 .891 1.063 0.442 2.560 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; Need for Cog = need for cognition; Coins N = 




Just as I did in Experiment 1, I tested the idea that tuning out would be beneficial 
for insight and creativity, but zoning out would not. Once again, I found that post-
incubation coins solvers did not tune out more (M = .13, SD = 0.18) than those who never 
solved (M = .15, SD = 0.14), t(99) = 0.54, p = .59, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.09], d = 0.12. And in 
terms of zoning out, post-incubation coins solvers did not differ (M = .12, SD = 0.21) 
from those who never solved (M = .13, SD = 0.15), t(99) = 0.27, p = .79, 95% CI [-0.07, 




Unlike Experiment 1, and contrary to Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler’s 
(2008) theory, post-incubation pigpen solvers actually tuned out significantly less (M = 
.05, SD = 0.04) than those who never solved (M = .15, SD = .18), t(33.24) = 4.43, p < 
.001, 95% [0.06, 0.15], d = 0.79 (note that equal variances were not assumed). In terms of 
zoning out, however, post-incubation pigpen solvers did not differ (M = .09, SD = 0.11) 
from those who never solved (M = .14, SD = 0.18), t(104) = 0.66, p = 0.51, 95% [-0.09, 
0.18], d = 0.31. Parallel to Experiment 1 results, regardless of what type of scoring was 
used, post-incubation divergent thinking was not related to tune outs (average r(107) = -
.08, p = .42; top-two r(107) = -.07, p = .46; max-two r(107) = -.08, p = .42) or zone outs 
(average r(107) = .14, p = .16; top-two r(107) = -.04, p = .71; max-two r(107) = .10, p = 
.31).  
Cross-experimental analyses of the pigpen problem revealed that, overall, people 
who solve after the incubation period did not significantly differ in tune outs (M = .14, 
SD = 0.18) from those who never solved (M = .21, SD = 0.20), t(214) = 1.48, p = .14, 
95% CI [-0.02, 0.16], d = 0.36. Likewise, in regards to zoning out, those who solved 
post-incubation did not differ (M = .11, SD = 0.15) from those who never solved (M = 
.15, SD = 0.17), t(214) = 1.04, p = .30, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.12], d = 0.25. 
Not surprisingly, cross-experimental analyses of the creativity task confirmed 
results from Experiments 1 and 2: Regardless of what type of scoring was used, post-
incubation divergent thinking was not related to tune outs (average r(223) = -.03, p = .69; 
top-two r(223) = -.04, p = .56; max-two r(223) = -.02, p = .73) or zone outs (average 




Pre-incubation solvers for the coins and pigpen problems were excluded in the 
primary analyses, as they were in Experiment 1, but will be reported here for 
completeness. Once again, subjects who solved the coins task pre-incubation did not 
differ in WMC z-scores (M = .11, SD = 0.66) from those who never solved (M z-score = -
.25, SD = 0.85), t(92) = -1.56, p = .12, 95% CI [-0.83, 0.10], d = -0.47, or those who 
solved post-incubation (M z-score = -.28, SD = 0.89), t(35) = -1.46, p = .15, 95% CI [-
0.94, 0.15], d = -0.50. Likewise, subjects who solved the pigpen problem pre-incubation 
period did not differ in WMC z-scores (M = -.04, SD = 0.57) from those who never 
solved (M z-score = -.25, SD = 0.87), t(106) = -.71, p = .48, 95% CI [-0.80, 0.38], d = -
0.29, or those who solved post-incubation (M z-score = .23, SD = 0.57), t(14) = .94, p = 
.36, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.89], d = 0.47. 
In addition, subjects who solved the coins before the incubation period did not 
differ in TUT rates (M = .20, SD = 0.19) from those who never solved (M TUT rate = .28, 
SD = 0.22), t(91) = 1.38, p = .17, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.21], d = 0.42, or those who solved 
after the incubation period (M TUT rate = .25, SD = 0.28), t(34) = .64, p = .53, 95% CI [-
0.12, 0.23], d = 0.23. Likewise, subjects who solved the pigpen problem before the 
incubation period did not differ in TUT rates (M = .24,  SD = 0.19) from those who never 
solved (M TUT rate = .29, SD = 0.26), t(106) = .63, p = .53, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.23], d = 
0.24, or those who solved after the incubation period (M TUT rate = .14, SD =0.13), t(14) 
= -1.10, p = .29, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.09], d = -0.57.  
Also in line with Experiment 1, pre-incubation creativity was not correlated with 




.45; max-two scoring: r(110) = .01, p = .93) or TUT rates during the creativity incubation 
tasks (average scoring: r(110) = .07, p = .45; top-two scoring: r(110) = .00, p = 1.00; 
max-two scoring: r(110) = .12, p = .21).  
With the Raven’s problem excluded, the only analytical problem that was used in 
Experiment 2 was the crime problem. As I found in Experiment 1, there was no 
statistically significant difference in WMC z-scores between solvers (M = -.48, SD = 
0.93) and non-solvers (M = -.15, SD =0.82), t(113) = 1.64, p = .11, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.75], 
d = -0.38.  
As noted earlier, the openness subscale comprises six facets (McCrae & Costa, 
2010). Of secondary interest was how these facets correlated with insight, creativity, and 
mind wandering during the reading tasks. In an exploratory analysis, I was especially 
interested in how the fantasy facet correlated with incubation TUT rates because, with 
statements like “I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its 
possibilities, letting it grow and develop” and “I would have difficulty just letting my 
mind wander without control or guidance” (reverse scored), it seemed to have some face 
validity in measuring a general propensity to mind wander in daily life.  
In fact, the fantasy facet was not correlated with probed TUT rates collapsed 
across all incubation reading tasks, r(112) = .08, p = .42, or tune out rates, r(112) = -.06, 
p = .52, but was trending towards a positive correlation with zone out rates, r(112) = .18, 
p = .06. Of the remaining facets, none correlated significantly with TUTs or zone outs, 
but the ideas facet was negatively correlated with tune outs, r(112) = -.22, p = .02. 




correlated with post-incubation creativity when the average scoring or max scoring was 
used (average r(107) = .25, p = .01; max-two r(107) = .20, p = .04 and was trending in 
the same direction when top-two scoring was used, r(107) = .18, p = .07. Regarding 
insight, the fantasy facet did predict coins solving, t(99) = -2.621, p = .01, 95% CI [-1.18, 
-0.16], d = -0.66, with post-incubation solvers scoring higher (M z-score = 1.21, SD = 
0.94) than non-solvers (M z-score = .54, SD = 1.09), but it did not predict solving in the 
pigpen problem, t(104) = 0.943, p = .35, 95% CI [-0.45, 1.28], d = 0.31 (post-incubation 
solvers: M z-score = .20, SD = 1.57; non-solvers: M z-score = .61, SD = 1.08).  
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, I was partly interested in conceptually replicating my results 
from Experiment 1, but I also added new questions regarding the personality measures. 
Overall, mind wandering during the attention-demanding tasks decreased from 
Experiment 1, perhaps because students found the reading tasks to be more interesting 
and engaging than the SART or n-back tasks used in Experiment 1. I replicated the 
finding from Experiment 1 that mind wandering during an incubation period is not 
beneficial for post-incubation insight problem solving or creativity. WMC was again 
unrelated to post-incubation creativity and post-incubation solving in the coins problem, 
and although it was not statistically significant (as it was in Experiment 1), it trended 
towards predicting post-incubation pigpen solving (and this effect was statistically 
significant in a combined-experiment analysis). Also in line with my Experiment 1 




to the context, and concentration did not moderate the relationship between WMC and 
TUTs.  
Cross-experimental analyses of the creativity tasks suggested what both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 had found separately—neither WMC nor TUT rates 
predicted post-incubation creativity. Regarding the new personality measures, I found 
that need for cognition predicted post-incubation performance in the coins insight 
problem, but not the pigpen problem or creativity tasks. Alternatively, openness to 
experience generally predicted post-incubation creativity, but did not predict insight. 
Finally, the fantasy subscale did not correlate with TUT rates, but it did predict post-
incubation creativity.  
Our inability to replicate the finding from Experiment 1 that post-incubation 
pigpen solvers have greater WMC than those who never solve is likely due to the small 
number of post-incubation pigpen solvers in Experiment 2 (N = 7), which was half the 
number from Experiment 1 (N = 14). Analyzing the pigpen problem across the two 
experiments, I found that post-incubation solvers had significantly greater WMC than 
those who never solved. In addition, post-incubation solvers tended to have lower TUT 
rates, although this was only trending. Changing the coins problem to a three dimensional 
format, on the other hand, increased coins solving rates—while there were only 7 post-
incubation solvers in Experiment 1, there were 22 post-incubation solvers in Experiment 
2—but still, neither WMC nor TUT rates predicted post-incubation solving. Although 
these two insight problems appear to have different relationships with WMC and TUT 




the insight construct isn’t consistent across problems, and, while I used two visual 
problems to help unify this construct, it does not appear to have worked. This issue may 
be a broader problem regarding the field of insight research and will be discussed more in 
the General Discussion.  
Just as I found in Experiment 1, WMC did not predict post-incubation creativity 
in Experiment 2, regardless of how creativity was scored. This replication goes against 
the perspective that executive control is beneficial for creativity, but it does add 
confidence to my initial, null, findings and suggests that my E1 results were not due to 
low power (as does the combined-experiment analysis I reported).  
 I also replicated my null results from Experiment 1 regarding incubation mind 
wandering and creativity. Despite efforts to give mind wandering its best possible chance 
to benefit creativity by changing my incubation task to modified science fiction readings, 
I found once again that incubation TUT rates did not predict post-incubation creativity.  
 Once again I tested the prediction that tuning out, but not zoning out, would be 
beneficial for insight and creativity, and once again I found this not to be the case. 
Neither tuning out nor zoning out predicted post-incubation performance on the coins 
task or the divergent thinking tasks, and whereas zoning out was not predictive of pigpen 
solving either, people who solved the pigpen problem post-incubation actually tuned out 
less than those who never solved. Collapsing across the data sets, cross-experimental 
analyses confirmed the null results from Experiment 1 that neither tuning out nor zoning 
out predicted post-incubation performance on either insight or divergent thinking tasks. 




makes no difference whether people are aware that they are mind wandering or not. 
Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler (2008) originally suggested that tuning out would 
be better because people would be aware that their creative insights occurred; however, 
based on my data, it seems as though people are not having any creative insights during 
the incubation period, and so it doesn’t matter if they are aware of their thoughts or not.  
Although initially I had predicted that there would be a negative correlation 
between WMC and TUTs when there was no reason to mind wander (i.e., during a stand-
alone task) and a null or positive correlation between the two when there was (i.e., during 
an incubation task), results from Experiment 1 suggested a trending pattern in the 
opposite direction. Because I used two different mind wandering tasks for the two 
different contexts (i.e., the stand-alone task was always the SART and the incubation task 
was always an n-back) in Experiment 1, it was difficult to separate the influence of task. 
In Experiment 2, however, I used a modified reading task for both the stand-alone task 
and the incubation tasks and I found that the correlation between WMC and TUTs did not 
vary based on context.  
 In Experiment 2, I once again found that concentration predicted variation in 
TUTs, but did not moderate the relationship between WMC and TUTs. Contrary to what 
previous research into daily life suggests, it does not appear that we are underestimating 
the relationship between WMC and TUTs in the laboratory, at least based on the current 
set of experiments.  
 A new hypothesis in Experiment 2 questioned whether intellectual motivation—




WMC and creativity or WMC and insight. Although I found that openness predicted 
post-incubation creativity and need for cognition predicted post-incubation coins problem 
solving, neither measure acted as a moderator. Previous work has suggested that people 
who score higher on openness to experience and the need for cognition may be more 
intellectually curious and have a greater motivation to perform well (in addition to 
actually performing better) on these creativity and insight problems (e.g., Dollinger, 
2003; McCrae, 1987). Overall, openness to experience seemed to correlate positively 
with post-incubation creativity but not post-incubation insight problem solving, and need 
for cognition was greater for post-incubation coins solvers but did not predict post-
incubation pigpen solving or post-incubation creativity. Of primary importance to my 
hypothesis, however, neither openness nor need for cognition moderated the relationship 
between WMC and insight or creativity. This suggests that an underlying motivational 









 Across two experiments, I tested the influence of individual differences in WMC 
and mind wandering on insight problem solving and creativity. Overall, the results 
suggest that WMC positively predicts post-incubation pigpen insight problem solving, 
but not post-incubation coins solving or divergent thinking. I consistently found that 
mind wandering during an incubation task was not beneficial for either insight problem 
solving or creativity. In addition, the correlation between WMC and TUTs did not change 
with context (i.e., stand-alone vs. incubation task), and it was not moderated by 
concentration. In Experiment 2, need for cognition positively predicted post-incubation 
coins solving, but not post-incubation pigpen solving or divergent thinking, and openness 
to experience predicted post-incubation divergent thinking but not post-incubation 
insight. Finally, although the fantasy subscale did not correlate with overall TUT rates, it 
did generally predict post-incubation creativity and post-incubation coins solving (but not 
pigpen), with higher fantasy scores related to better post-incubation performance.  
 Our first question was: is executive control helpful for insight and creativity? In 
Experiment 1 I found that greater WMC predicted post-incubation solving in the pigpen 
insight problem, but not the coins insight problem. Although changing the coins format to 
three-dimensional in Experiment 2 did increase the number of solvers (N = 22), WMC 




significantly predict pigpen post-incubation solving in Experiment 2 either (which saw a 
decrease in solvers from N = 14 in Experiment 1 to N = 7 in Experiment 2), but the 
pattern trended in the same direction as what I had found in Experiment 1. In addition, 
cross-experimental analyses indicated that when the data were collapsed across the two 
experiments, WMC did predict post-incubation pigpen solving. This finding is not 
completely unreasonable given the inconsistent findings within the insight literature, 
suggesting that insight problems do not share much predictive variance, but are rather 
made up largely of variance specific to each task (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). Despite 
my attempts to find roughly equivalent insight problems, it appears that these tasks have 
less in common than I had anticipated. Still, previous research on the pigpen problem 
(e.g., Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009) and the coins problem (e.g., 
Ash & Wiley, 2006) has separately implicated a role for WMC in each of these problems. 
So why was I able to replicate one but not the other? It could be related to the way the 
coins problem was displayed. Although both the two dimensional format and the three 
dimensional format have been used before, previous research has only suggested a role 
for WMC in the two dimensional format of the problem (Ash & Wiley), and in my 
current set of experiments, I did not have enough solvers in that format (N = 7) to relate 
with any other measure. In addition, Ash and Wiley did not present WMC analyses 
separately for their individual problems; instead, they found that WMC predicted solving 
in the Many Moves Available category, which included but was not limited to the coins 




in insight problem solving, it will be extremely important to use many different tasks, 
rather than one or two.  
 Across both experiments, and in the cross-experimental analyses, I found that 
WMC did not predict post-incubation creativity. While some research has suggested that 
WMC and focused attentional control may be harmful to performance in creativity tasks 
(Aiello, Jarosz, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012; Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012), these studies 
have often used the Remote Associates Task, which I would argue does not measure 
divergent thinking, but rather convergent thinking. While both divergent and convergent 
thinking seem to be important for creativity, convergent thinking is commonplace in 
analytical problem solving, but it is divergent thinking that is unique to creativity. The 
lack of correlation between WMC and creativity is still somewhat surprising, however, 
given the established relationship between general fluid intelligence and creativity 
(Gilhooly et al., 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia, 2008). As mentioned previously, 
general fluid intelligence correlates strongly with WMC and is thought to at least partly 
reflect a domain general, executive-attention ability. If general fluid intelligence predicts 
creativity but WMC does not, that would suggest that the relationship between Gf and 
creativity is not driven by the variance shared between WMC and Gf. Although it is 
entirely possible, this would be the first time that the shared executive attention was not 
responsible for explaining variance in higher order cognitive abilities. My null result also 
seems surprising when I consider WMC’s sterling reputation in predicting many higher-
order cognitive tasks; however, a couple of newly published studies have also failed to 




Therriault, 2013; Lin & Lien, 2013). Indubitably, future work will be required to follow 
up on this result and attempt to separate the variance that is responsible for predicting 
performance in creativity tasks.  
 Our second question was: is lack of executive control helpful for insight and 
creativity? Both experiments here suggest that lack of executive control, as measured by 
mind wandering, is not helpful for post-incubation insight problem solving or creativity, 
and may even be detrimental in the pigpen insight problem. This finding contradicts 
conjecture by Schooler and colleagues that mind wandering should be helpful for 
creativity, especially during an incubation period (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). Furthermore, my results indirectly contradict recent work by Baird and 
colleagues (2012) that was published while I was collecting data for Experiment 2.  
 In their study, Baird et al. (2012) found that the only group of subjects to show 
improvement in creativity from pre- to post-incubation was the group in the undemanding 
incubation task condition. Importantly, this same group reported the most mind 
wandering during incubation according to a retrospective questionnaire. In addition, they 
found that creativity correlated positively with scores on a general propensity measure of 
daydreaming in daily life (Imaginal Process Inventory, Daydreaming Frequency subscale; 
Singer & Antrobus, 1972). Taken together, Baird and colleagues concluded that these 
results suggest a beneficial role for mind wandering in creative problem solving. 
Why did my findings differ from those of Baird et al.? Although the present set of 
experiments and the study that Baird et al. conducted both use an incubation task inserted 




mind wandering during the incubation tasks using in-the-moment, online thought probes, 
whereas Baird et al. used a retrospective measure, asking subjects after the incubation 
period to report, on a 1–5 scale, how frequently they were mind wandering during the 
incubation task. In addition, whereas I found no correlation between incubation TUT 
rates and post-incubation creativity, Baird and colleagues failed to report this analysis 
entirely. Instead, they used a two-step, round-about method, whereby they first compared 
TUT rates across the different incubation tasks and then compared change in pre- to post-
incubation creativity across the different incubation tasks, in order to make the claim that 
TUT rates are related to creativity, when in fact, these are very different conclusions. 
Using my data, collapsed across both experiments, I ran the analysis that Baird et al. 
should have ran: I correlated change in pre- to post-incubation divergent thinking 
performance with incubation TUT rates. But, regardless of whether I used average, top-
two, or max-two scoring, change in divergent thinking performance was not correlated 
with incubation TUT rates (average r(221) = -.04, p = .55; top-two r(221) = -.04, p = .55; 
max-two r(221) = -.03, p = .68), suggesting that there may have been a reason Baird et al. 
did not report these analyses. In fact, the only evidence Baird et al. presented which 
directly implicates mind wandering as beneficial for creativity was their correlation 
between post-incubation creativity and their broad questionnaire measure of propensity to 
daydream in daily life, rather than the rates of reported mind wandering during the 
incubation period. This final point, however, may be the only place where our analyses 




positive correlation that I find between creativity and the fantasy facet of openness does 
parallel their results.4  
So why don’t probed TUT rates correlate with the broad retrospective measure, 
and why does only the latter predict creativity? One possibility is that people are able to 
report their mind wandering in-the-moment, but when they have to aggregate this 
information and report it in a retrospective questionnaire, they are unable to do so. 
Instead, perhaps they are reporting self-perception rather than reality in the retrospective 
questionnaire, and what this correlation is capturing is that people who are more creative 
tend to think of themselves as daydreamers, waiting for creative inspiration to come. 
Another possibility is that some people really do mind-wander a lot in daily life, but it 
doesn’t translate into the artificial setting in the lab, and so my in-the-moment probes 
don’t pick up on it.   
 Our third question was: does the correlation between WMC and TUTs vary by 
context? Although I did not find evidence of WMC predicting flexibility in mind 
wandering depending on the context in either of my two experiments here, I may not be 
able to rule out this hypothesis just yet. Despite efforts to imply that mind wandering may 
be beneficial during an incubation task by telling subjects they would return to their 
previous insight or creativity task immediately after the incubation period, it is possible 
                                                          
4 In a third experiment that will be included for publication, I modified my current design 
from Experiments 1 and 2 to include Baird et al.’s shorter incubation task along with the 
Imaginal Process Inventory for daydreaming with the intention of providing conditions 
that would give mind wandering its best possible chance to benefit creativity. I also 
included the Imaginal Process Inventory for mind wandering and kept my online thought 




that this may not have been obvious enough of a cue. Future work may consider a more 
direct approach whereby subjects are either told that mind wandering could be beneficial 
during an incubation period or they are simply instructed to mind wander during the 
incubation task.  
 Our fourth question was: does concentration moderate the relationship between 
WMC and TUTs? Past research into daily life has found an association between WMC 
and TUTs, but only when concentration is high (Kane et al., 2007). Since previous lab 
research has not taken concentration into account, I tested the possibility that the 
correlation between WMC and TUTs has been underestimated. In both experiments, 
however, I found this not to be the case. Although I found considerable variability in my 
concentration measure across these two studies, it is likely that concentration on daily life 
tasks is inherently more variable than that required across similar lab tasks. 
 Our fifth question, which was only tested in Experiment 2, was: does intellectual 
motivation moderate the relationship between WMC and insight or creativity? Using the 
openness subscale of the NEO along with the need for cognition questionnaire to 
ascertain estimates of effort and how highly subjects valued the goal of the task, I 
hypothesized that these measures would moderate the association between WMC and 
insight or creativity. Given my failure to find an association between WMC and 
creativity, I was particularly interested in whether a pattern would emerge once 
intellectual motivation was taken into account—perhaps WMC would predict creativity 
when intellectual motivation was high. Although I found that openness predicted 




moderated the relationship between WMC and creativity or insight. The inconsistency in 
how need for cognition related to the insight problems provides further evidence that I 
was not tapping into a unified insight construct with the coins and pigpen problem.  
 In conclusion, I demonstrated across two experiments that mind wandering is not 
beneficial for creativity or insight problem solving, and could in fact be harmful. 
Alternatively, WMC did predict post-incubation pigpen solving, but not post-incubation 
coins solving or post-incubation creativity. Although my results were inconsistent 
between the two insight tasks, it is safe to conclude that WMC is not harmful to insight 
problem solving and that mind wandering certainly is not helpful. Regarding creativity, 
there appears to be no association with WMC or in-the-moment mind wandering during 
an incubation period—null results which were replicated across two experiments with 
considerable sample sizes (N > 120 in each). In our second experiment, however, the 
fantasy facet of openness did correlate positively with creativity. Regarding task context, 
the correlation between WMC and TUTs did not fluctuate based on the potential for 
benefit (i.e., during an incubation task). Finally, my measures of intellectual motivation—
openness to experience and need for cognition—did not interact with WMC to predict 
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N-BACK STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1 MIND WANDERING TASKS 
 
 
Countries Body Parts Instruments Colors 
France Heart Oboe Green 
China Foot Violin Orange 
Spain Head Organ Black 
Italy Hand Banjo Pink 
Russia Brain Piano White 
Brazil Nose Cymbal Brown 
Mexico Arms Tuba Gray 
India Legs Flute Red 
Greece Neck Drum Gold 
Sweden Ear Harp Yellow 
Japan Eye Sax Purple 









EXPERIMENT 1 MEAN ACCURACY AND REACTION TIMES BY TASK 
 
 
 Accuracy RT 
 M SD M SD 
SART Target Trials .420 .222   369.469   77.352 
SART Non-Target Trials .933 .049   446.479   89.661 
Coins N-back Target Trials .772 .196   850.984 230.546 
Coins N-back Non-Target Trials .973 .046 1095.834 574.543 
Coins N-back Lure Trials .870 .108   981.211 298.798 
Pigpen N-back Target Trials .793 .186   843.432 229.570 
Pigpen N-back Non-Target Trials .977 .045 1010.872 464.521 
Pigpen N-back Lure Trials .877 .100 1058.591 321.313 
Brick N-back Target Trials .768 .215   840.427 229.886 
Brick N-back Non-Target Trials .970 .048   909.151 465.074 
Brick N-back Lure Trials .852 .112 1009.053 280.958 
Knife N-back Target Trials .765 .195   844.443 233.704 
Knife N-back Non-Target Trials .971 .045   984.665 519.659 
Knife N-back Lure Trials .876 .097 1053.134 367.940 






EXPERIMENT 2 MEAN ACCURACY AND REACTION TIMES BY TASK 
 
 
 Accuracy RT 
 M SD M SD 
Stand-alone Reading Task Target Trials  .440 .169 492.416   78.146 
Stand-alone Reading Task Non-Target Trials  .981 .022 514.482 111.037 
Coins Reading Task Target Trials  .521 .168 473.221   91.447 
Coins Reading Task Non-Target Trials  .983 .024 487.750 103.516 
Pigpen Reading Task Target Trials  .497 .179 480.617   99.992 
Pigpen Reading Task Non-Target Trials  .983 .020 489.136 116.983 
Brick Reading Task Target Trials  .484 .185 484.864   93.675 
Brick Reading Task Non-Target Trials  .985 .014 463.303 111.890 
Knife Reading Task Target Trials  .480 .172 484.397   97.585 
Knife Reading Task Non-Target Trials  .983 .026 482.256 117.217 
Stand-alone Reading Comprehension Questions 4.388 .892 – – 
Coins Reading Comprehension Questions 4.548 .740 – – 
Pigpen Reading Comprehension Questions 4.362 .973 – – 
Brick Reading Comprehension Questions 4.422 .925 – – 
Knife Reading Comprehension Questions 4.522 .809 – – 
Note. Reading comprehension questions were scored out of 5. 
